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INTRODUCTION 
Enrichment without cause was introduced into the Louisiana Civil 
Code as revised Article 2298.1 As indicated in the revision comments,2 this 
provision codified preexisting jurisprudence that had imported the theory 
                                                                                                             
 1. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2298 (2018); Act No. 713, § 1, 1995 La. Acts No. 
1041 (codified as LA. CIV. CODE art. 2298 (1996)). The Quasi-Contracts Committee 
of the Louisiana State Law Institute, chaired by Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos, 
prepared the initial draft of this revised Article. See Cheryl Martin, Louisiana State 
Law Institute Proposes Revision of Negotiorum Gestio and Codification of Unjust 
Enrichment, 69 TUL. L. REV. 181 (1994). 
 2. Art. 2298 cmt. a.  
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of actio de in rem verso,3 together with the mysteries4 of this theory’s 
jurisprudential past. 
Generally, liability for enrichment without cause requires a 
displacement of wealth in favor of the enriched obligor at the expense of 
the impoverished obligee. Morever, this displacement is not justified by 
the will of the parties or by operation of law.5 The remedy provided is 
subsidiary. It is intended to restore this patrimonial imbalance while at the 
same time rectifying the inequity of the situation pursuant to the moral 
directives of equity and commutative justice.6 
This Article explores two mysteries surrounding the theory of 
enrichment without cause that still bedevil scholars and the courts—the 
theory’s foundation and its scope of application. Part I examines the 
history, characteristic features, and underlying principles of enrichment 
without cause as a source of obligations and a special expression of the 
more general principle of unjustified enrichment.7 Part II applies this 
                                                                                                             
 3. In France, the actio de in rem verso was introduced in the seminal decision 
of the Cour de cassation in the Boudier case. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court 
for judicial matters] req., June 15, 1892, D. 1892, 1, 596, S. 1893, 1, 281, note J.-E. 
Labbé (Fr.); HENRI CAPITANT ET AL., 2 LES GRANDS ARRETS DE LA JURISPRUDENCE 
CIVILE, OBLIGATIONS, CONTRATS SPECIAUX, SURETES No. 241 (13th ed. 2015) (Fr.). 
The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized the actio de in rem verso in the landmark 
cases Minyard v. Curtis Prod., Inc., 205 So. 2d 422 (La. 1967) and Edmonston v. A-
Second Mortgage Co., 289 So. 2d 116 (La. 1974). ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, LOUISIANA 
LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT IN QUASI-CONTRACTS 344, 355–60 (1991).  
 4. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Presentation to the Civil Law Property Students at the 
Loyola University New Orleans College of Law: Mysteries of the Louisiana Civil 
Code (Oct. 19, 2015), https://vimeo.com/143021101 [https://perma.cc/V3DW-
8L8K] (discussing “truths, half-truths, and falsehoods” of Louisiana civil law).  
 5. Scott v. Wesley, 589 So. 2d 26, 27 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (“The root 
principle of an unjustified enrichment . . . is that the plaintiff suffers an economic 
detriment for which he should not be responsible, while the defendant receives an 
economic benefit for which he has not paid.”). 
 6. See 9 CHARLES AUBRY & CHARLES RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL 
FRANÇAIS No. 578 (Etienne Bartin ed., 5th ed. 1897–1923). 
 7. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1757, 2298. Courts often use the terms 
“unjust(ified) enrichment” and “enrichment without cause” interchangeably. 
These two terms, however, should be distinguished. “Unjustified enrichment” is 
a general principle of law, whereas “enrichment without cause” is a specific 
source of obligations. This Article does not discuss the general principle of 
unjustified enrichment, the expression of which is found in several areas of the 
law, including enrichment without cause. See DIG. 12.6.14 (Pomponius, Ad 
Sabinum 21) (“For it is by nature fair that nobody should enrich himself at the 
expense of another.”) and DIG. 50.17.206 (Pomponius, Ex Variis Lectionibus 9) 
(“By the law of nature it is fair that no one become richer by the loss and injury 
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historical and comparative information in an attempt to decipher the 
precise scope of application of enrichment without cause in Louisiana law, 
in hopes that this contribution will prompt a more general discussion on 
the formulation of a coherent Louisiana model of enrichment without 
cause.8  
I. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ENRICHMENT WITHOUT CAUSE  
The foundation of enrichment without cause is the first mystery to 
explore. This mystery is an ancient one, dating back to a historical 
misunderstanding among early French and German jurists as to the 
meaning of certain Roman legal concepts. Exploring these Roman 
concepts and this French-German misunderstanding will perhaps help 
solve this first mystery.  
A. Roman Law Foundations  
The historical foundation of enrichment without cause, as a modern 
source of obligations, is traced back to Justinian and his Corpus Iuris 
Civilis.9 The compilers of the Roman texts enunciated the principle of 
unjustified enrichment based on two actions of the classical Roman 
period—the condictio and the actio de in rem verso. 
                                                                                                             
of another.”); cf. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2055; Vernon V. Palmer, The Many 
Guises of Equity in a Mixed Jurisdiction: A Functional View of Equity in 
Louisiana, 69 TUL. L. REV. 7, 42–47 (1994) (referring to unjustified enrichment 
as an example of the application of the principle of equity by Louisiana courts); 
David W. Gruning, Codifying Civil Law: Principle and Practice, 51 LOY. L. REV. 
57, 64 (2005) (using the principle of unjustified enrichment as an example of a 
principle of law interacting with practice). Also, this Article does not cover issues 
concerning the consequences of enrichment without cause.  
 8. In essence, this Article attempts to uncover hidden truths, clarify half-
truths, and dispel falsehoods concerning the mysterious actio de in rem verso. See 
Yiannopoulos, supra note 4. 
 9. Translated texts from the Digest are taken from THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 
(Theodor Mommsen et al. eds., 1985). Translated texts from the Institutes of 
Justinian are taken from THOMAS COLLETT SANDARS, THE INSTITUTES OF 
JUSTINIAN WITH ENGLISH INTRODUCTION, TRANSLATION, AND NOTES (12th rev. 
ed. 1917) (1898). Translated texts from the Institutes of Gaius and from 
Justinian’s Code are taken from SAMUEL P. SCOTT, THE CIVIL LAW (1932). 
Bracketed terms are additions by the author. Translations from the original texts 
in French, German, and Greek are by the author. 
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1. Condictio and Actio de in Rem Verso 
A substantive concept of enrichment without cause was unknown in 
classical Roman law.10 Instead, Roman lawyers had developed several 
actions intended for the restoration or restitution of displaced wealth.11 The 
modern concept traces its roots to two such nominate actions of the 
classical Roman law—the condictio and the actio de in rem verso.12  
The condictio authorized recovery by the plaintiff of a certain object 
or money in the hands of the defendant.13 The condictio was an abstract 
action.14 The plaintiff was not required to state the cause for his demand.15 
In its early form, the condictio was restricted to the recovery of identifiable 
objects or money16 found in the hands of the defendant without just 
cause.17 The purpose of the condictio was restoration in the strictest sense: 
                                                                                                             
 10. MICHAEL STATHOPOULOS, AXIOSIS ADIKAIOLOGITOU PLOUTISMOU 
[CLAIM OF UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT] 2 (1972) (Greece) [hereinafter 
STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT]. 
 11. See Barry Nicholas, Unjustified Enrichment in the Civil Law and 
Louisiana Law: Part I, 36 TUL. L. REV. 605, 606–07 (1962) [hereinafter Nicholas 
I]; 1 GEORGE PETROPOULOS, HISTORIA KAI EISIGISEIS TOU ROMAIKOU DIKAIOU 
[HISTORY AND INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW] 610–14 (2d ed. 1963, reprinted 2008) 
(Greece) [hereinafter PETROPOULOS I].  
 12. See PETROPOULOS I, supra note 11, at 1042–43; Shael Herman, The 
Contribution of Roman Law to the Jurisprudence of Antebellum Louisiana, 56 LA. 
L. REV. 257, 276–80 (1995) (comparing the civil and common law history of the 
general principle of unjustified enrichment).  
 13. See MAX RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 293–97 (1927). 
 14. ALAN WATSON, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE LATER ROMAN 
REPUBLIC 10 (1965, reprinted 1984); LEOPOLD WENGER, INSTITUTES OF THE 
ROMAN LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 166 (Otis Harrison Fisk trans., rev. ed. 1986); 
PAUL FRÉDÉRIC GIRARD, MANUEL ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT ROMAIN 649 n.1 (Félix 
Senn ed., 8th ed. 1929). 
 15. See WATSON, supra note 14, at 10; WENGER, supra note 14, at 166; 
GIRARD, supra note 14, at 649 n.1.  
 16. Condictio dare oportene certam rem. Later, the action also included 
incorporeal things, such as obligations [causa liberationis]. See FRITZ SCHULZ, 
CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 614 (1951); 2 MAX KASER, DAS RÖMISCHE 
PRIVATRECHT § 270 (2d ed. 1975). 
 17. See JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW 419 (2006) 
[hereinafter GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS] (citing Windscheid “a person was liable for 
‘a thing which he has without just basis [justa causa]’” and DIG. 25.2.25, 12.7.1.3). 
In classical Roman law, the term causa, when used to describe the condictio, was 
not a technical term of art. Depending on the context, causa referred to the Latin 
word for “reason,” “situation,” or specific objects—res. See RADIN, supra note 13, 
at 297–300; SAÚL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 203, in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
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an object held by the defendant without lawful cause ought to be returned 
to the plaintiff who had never lost ownership of this object.18 The element 
of enrichment was noticeably missing from the original concept of 
condictio, although in most cases the defendant was indeed enriched at the 
expense of the plaintiff by withholding the object in question.19  
Especially for the cases of enrichment of a master caused by his 
servant’s acts or transactions, a special and very specific remedy was 
given—the actio de peculio,20 which later developed into the praetorian 
actio de in rem verso.21 This praetorian action was a causal action, 
meaning that the plaintiff bore the burden of specifying the cause for his 
demand.22 Since its inception, this action directly entailed the element of 
restitution of assets that had exited the patrimony of the plaintiff and 
entered the defendant’s patrimony through the acts of the defendant’s 
                                                                                                             
TREATISE (1969) [hereinafter LIVTINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I]. Aristotle identified four 
types of cause: matter—material cause; form—formal cause; agent—efficient 
cause; and purpose—final cause. Aristotle, Physics II.3 192–95. Causa finalis was 
eventually adopted under the civilian theory of cause. See CHRISTOS FILIOS, H AITIA 
STIS ENOCHIKES SYMVASEIS [THE CAUSA CONTRAHENDI] 30, 101–25 (2007) 
(Greece); cf. GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS, supra, at 292–93 (discussing Aristotle’s 
influence on the postglossators’ theories of cause).  
 18. See MAX KASER, DAS ALTRÖMISCHE JUS 286–88 (1949). The defendant 
in a condictio was considered a borrower who was charged with returning the 
object. The resemblance of the Roman condictio to the modern-day loan for use 
(commodatum) and consumption (mutuum) is striking. See id. at 287; cf. LA. CIV. 
CODE ANN. arts. 2891, 2901 (2018). The affinity of the early condictio with the 
loan contract also explains the legal nature of the obligation of compensation for 
enrichment without cause. This obligation attaches to the acquirer of the enrichment, 
thus resembling a propter rem obligation, or a “real obligation,” to refer to the 
inaccurate term of art that has prevailed in France and Louisiana. See GASTON MAY, 
ELÉMENTS DE DROIT ROMAIN 416 (18th ed. 1935). For a discussion of real 
obligations, see generally A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 9:29, in 2 LOUISIANA 
CIVIL LAW TREATISE (5th ed. 2015) [hereinafter YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY]; A.N. 
Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Louisiana and Comparative Law: Part I, 23 LA. L. 
REV. 161 (1963); A.N. Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Louisiana and Comparative 
Law: Part II, 23 LA. L. REV. 618 (1963); L. David Cromwell & Chloé Chetta, 
Divining the Real Nature of Real Obligations, 92 TUL. L. REV. 127 (2017). 
 19. See 2 HENRY JOHN ROBY, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW IN THE TIMES OF CICERO 
AND OF THE ANTONINES 76–77 (1902, reprinted 1975). 
 20. DIG. 15.1.41 (Ulpian, Ad Sabinum 43). 
 21. See GIRARD, supra note 14, at 710–11, 715–16. 
 22. See ROBY, supra note 19, at 245–46; WILLIAM W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-
BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 533–34, 536 (2d ed. 1932) 
[hereinafter BUCKLAND, TEXTBOOK]. 
2018] DEMYSTIFYING ENRICHMENT WITHOUT CAUSE 1229 
 
 
 
servant.23 It is aptly said, therefore, that this action more closely resembles 
modern concepts of unjustified enrichment, especially in civilian systems 
modeled after the Code Napoleon.24 
The idea of unjustified enrichment appeared at the time of the Corpus 
Iuris Civilis.25 A general principle of restitution for unjustified enrichment, 
based on notions of Aristotelian commutative justice26 and Christian 
values,27 appeared in the Digest.28 This general principle of law later 
influenced several Roman institutions29 of property and obligations law.30 
                                                                                                             
 23. Thus, a typical actio de in rem verso imposes liability on the defendant 
master who was enriched at the expense of the plaintiff third party through the acts 
of the master’s servant. See REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: 
ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 878–84 (1990, reprinted 1992); 
STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 6–7. 
 24. See ZIMMERMANN, supra note 23, at 878–84; STATHOPOULOS, 
UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 6–7; PAUL JÖRS & WOLFGANG 
KUNKEL, RÖMISCHES PRIVATRECHT 267 (3d ed. 1949). 
 25. See GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 419. 
 26. Id. at 12, 424; see also JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS 
OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE 10–11, 30–31 (1991, reprinted 2011) 
[hereinafter GORDLEY, ORIGINS]. 
 27. See JOHN DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
52–53 (1951); ULTRICH VON LÜBTOW, BEITRÄGE ZUR LEHRE VON DER CONDICTIO 
NACH RÖMISCHEN UND GELTENDEM RECHT 22–24 (1952). 
 28. See DIG. 12.6.14 (Pomponius, Ad Sabinum 21) (“For it is by nature fair 
that nobody should enrich himself at the expense of another.”) and DIG. 50.17.206 
(Pomponius, Ex Variis Lectionibus 9) (“By the law of nature it is fair that no one 
become richer by the loss and injury of another.”); see also GEORGES RIPERT, LA 
REGLE MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS CIVILES 249 (4th ed. 1949). 
 29. See Gruning, supra note 7, at 64 (using the principle of unjustified 
enrichment as an example of a principle of law interacting with practice). 
 30. For example, the regulation of the rights and obligations of the owner vis-
à-vis a possessor of a thing is based on precepts of unjust enrichment. See infra note 
234. Likewise, the restitution interest in the area of the law of conventional 
obligations is a manifestation of the principle of unjust enrichment. Cf. SAÚL 
LITVINOFF, LAW OF OBLIGATIONS § 14:2, in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2d 
ed. 2001) [hereinafter LITVINOFF, DAMAGES]; L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, The 
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 54 (1936); see also 2 
BORIS STARCK, DROIT CIVIL, OBLIGATIONS, CONTRAT ET QUASI CONTRAT, RÉGIME 
GÉNÉRAL No. 1797 (Henri Roland & Laurent Boyer eds., 2d ed. 1986) (referring to 
accession, improvements by possessors, community property, nullity especially for 
incapacity, payment of a thing not due, and improvements made by lessees as 
expression of the general principle of unjustified enrichment).  
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This principle also augmented the Roman nominate actions, adding to 
them the element of enrichment.31 
The condictiones were grouped into nominate categories.32 Thus, a 
condictio could be instituted when the plaintiff had given a thing or 
money: (a) in contemplation of a future result that did not follow;33 (b) for 
a reason disapproved by law or repugnant to public policy;34 (c) by mistake 
because payment was not actually due;35 or (d) without a good reason for 
the transaction.36 Further, the actio de in rem verso gradually developed 
and expanded to cover instances in which third parties were enriched at 
the expense of the impoverished obligee.37 More importantly, enrichment 
without cause was recognized as a source of obligations under the heading 
of “quasi-contract.”38 
                                                                                                             
 31. See Werner Flume, Der Wegfall der Berwicherung in der Entwicklung 
vom römischen zum geltenden Recht 103, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS 
NIEDERMEYER (Universität Göttingen ed., 1953). 
 32. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 23, at 838–57; CARL SALKOWSKI, INSTITUTES 
AND HISTORY OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 682–85 (E.E. Whitfield trans., 1886, 
reprinted 1994); FREDERICK TOMKINS & HENRY JENCKEN, A COMPENDIUM OF 
THE MODERN ROMAN LAW 396–401 (1870, reprinted 2000). 
 33. DIG. 12.4 (condictio causa data causa non secuta—otherwise known as 
condictio ob causam datorum). See PETROPOULOS I, supra note 11, at 1048–49.  
 34. DIG. 12.5 (condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam). See PETROPOULOS 
I, supra note 11, at 1048. 
 35. DIG. 12.6 (condictio indebiti). See PETROPOULOS I, supra note 11, at 1044–48. 
 36. DIG. 12.7 (condictio sine causa). See PETROPOULOS I, supra note 11, at 
1049. This type of condictio seems to be a residual category, encompassing 
situations in which the enrichment was attributed to a cause that had expired 
(causa finita—see DIG. 12.7.2 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 32)) or where the enrichment 
itself was not a thing given by the plaintiff but a promise made by the plaintiff, 
from which he is now seeking a release (causa liberationis—see DIG. 12.7.1 
(Ulpian, Ad Sabinum 43) and 12.7.3 (Julian, Digestorum 8)). See STATHOPOULOS, 
UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 3–4.  
 37. DIG. 17.2.82 (Papinian, Responsorum 3); CODE JUST. 4.26.7 (Diocletian 
& Maximian 290/293) (actio de in rem verso utilis). See 2 GEORGE PETROPOULOS, 
HISTORIA KAI EISIGISEIS TOU ROMAIKOU DIKAIOU [HISTORY AND INSTITUTES OF 
ROMAN LAW] 1146–47 (2d ed. 1963, reprinted 2008) (Greece). See generally 
ANDREAS VON TUHR, ACTIO DE IN REM VERSO (1895). 
 38. J. INST. 3.13 (“A further division separates [obligations] into four kinds, 
for they arise either from [contract, quasi-contract, delict, or a quasi-delict].”). 
Gaius had initially identified contracts and delicts as sources of obligations and 
later added quasi-contracts and quasi delicts as “other sources.” See DIG. 44.7.1.pr 
(Gaius, Aureorum 2) (“Obligations arise either from contract or from 
wrongdoing, or by some special right from various types of causes.”) (emphasis 
added). Traditionally, the heading of quasi-contract included the management of 
2018] DEMYSTIFYING ENRICHMENT WITHOUT CAUSE 1231 
 
 
 
The concept of unjustified enrichment, as an institution of substantive 
law, is therefore a product of Justinian’s law. It is an amalgamation of 
Roman pragmatism with equitable considerations and moral principles of 
Greek philosophy.39 Although this body of law was well received by the 
post-glossators40 and eventually by the European civil codes, the compiled 
texts were less than clear about the requirements and scope of application 
of enrichment without cause.41 The foundation of enrichment without 
cause is one of its mysteries, tracing its roots to conflicting interpretations 
of a passage written by the Roman jurist Ulpian concerning the cause—
causa—of contracts. 
                                                                                                             
affairs of another [negotiorum gestio]; tutorship [tutela] and curatorship [cura]; 
co-ownership [communio incidens]; and enrichment without cause [condictiones 
and actio de in rem verso]. See WILLIAM W. BUCKLAND, A MANUAL OF ROMAN 
PRIVATE LAW § 123 (2d ed. 1953, reprinted 1981) [hereinafter BUCKLAND, 
MANUAL]; WILLIAM W. BUCKLAND, ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF THE ROMAN 
PRIVATE LAW No. 133 (1912) [hereinafter BUCKLAND, PRINCIPLES]; 2 BERNHARD 
WINDSCHEID, LEHRBUCH DES PANDEKTENRECHTS § 421 (7th ed. 1891); 
FERDINAND MACKELDEY, HANDBOOK OF THE ROMAN LAW § 491 (Moses Dropsie 
trans., 8th ed. 1883); RUDOLPH SOHM, THE INSTITUTES: A TEXTBOOK OF THE 
HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW § 83 (James Crawford Ledlie 
trans., 3d ed. 1907, reprinted 1994); WILLIAM BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF 
ROMAN LAW AND THEIR RELATION TO MODERN LAW 476–84 (1938, reprinted 
1989); PETROPOULOS I, supra note 11, at 1035–50. 
 39. This expansion of Roman ideas occurred through several interpolations 
and misinterpretations of Roman texts. See STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED 
ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 13. 
 40. See FRÉDÉRIC ZENATI-CASTAING & THIERRY REVET, COURS DE DROIT 
CIVIL: CONTRATS, THÉORIE GÉNÉRALE, QUASI-CONTRATS No. 226 (2014) 
(discussing the efforts of Baldus to enunciate a general and unitary action of 
enrichment without cause). 
 41. See SCHULZ, supra note 16, at 611 (“The classical law was sound and 
cleverly contrived in spite of some gaps which ought to have been filled in; but 
the compilers have completely ruined the classical law. They unwisely extended 
the scope of these actions and unhappily modified their content by numerous 
interpolations which have obscured and confused the classical law without giving 
a clear exposition of the Byzantine law. [Unjust enrichment] law is one of the 
worst parts of Justinian’s law; it has confused and irritated generations of lawyers 
and exercised an evil influence on continental codifications down to our times. 
The German Civil Code (BGB) is a warning example.”). 
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2. Ulpian’s Causa 
In the classical Roman law of obligations, the concept of causa42 was 
marginal because of the strict formalism in the creation of contracts.43 The 
significance of cause slowly began to emerge during the post-classical 
period and became more evident during the Middle Ages when the 
heightened formality requirements for contracts were gradually reduced, 
thus enabling the speedier and more informal formation of contracts.44 
This shift toward informality, however, created a void in contract law and 
theory concerning the requirements for the validity of contract.45 This gap 
was filled by the civilian theory of cause as it is known today. In short, the 
old formalism was replaced with causality in contemporary contract law.46  
This movement is evidenced in the Corpus Iuris Civilis, in which 
several excerpts, original or interpolated older texts, emphasizing the 
causa of conventional obligations began to appear.47 Perhaps the most 
notable and debated48 excerpt comes from Ulpian’s “Commentary of the 
Edict.”49 
                                                                                                             
 42. Cause of conventional obligations is a topic extensively discussed and 
debated elsewhere. See, e.g., LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 17, §§ 196–
242; Ernest G. Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts, 28 
YALE L.J. 621 (1919). For the purposes of this Article, the discussion adopts the 
prevailing theory of cause as accepted in Louisiana. See Saúl Litvinoff, Still 
Another Look at Cause, 48 LA. L. REV. 3 (1987) [hereinafter Litvinoff, Cause].  
 43. See SCHULZ, supra note 16, at 471; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra 
note 17, § 202; John Denson Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LA. L. REV. 
2, 4 (1951). 
 44. See ZIMMERMANN, supra note 23, at 553. 
 45. See SCHULZ, supra note 16, at 471; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra 
note 17, § 208; Smith, supra note 43, at 4. 
 46. LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 17, § 208; Smith, supra note 43, at 4. 
 47. See FILIOS, supra note 17, at 25–35. 
 48. Id. at 2–3; see also WILLIAM W. BUCKLAND & ARNOLD D. MCNAIR, 
ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 229–30 (Frederick H. Lawson, 2d rev. ed. 1952) 
(referring to Ulpian’s excerpt as “the famous passage on which the whole theory 
of cause was based” and noting that “[it] was taken to mean that every contract 
must have a cause, [when] in reality [it] says nothing of the kind”); GORDLEY, 
ORIGINS, supra note 26, at 49–50; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 17, § 
205; Lorenzen, supra note 42, at 624–25.  
 49. DIG. 2.14.7 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 4). 
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In this text, Ulpian refers to certain innominate “synallagmatic50 
contracts” in which agreed performances were exchanged by the parties.51 
These contracts, not belonging to the recognized nominate types of 
contracts,52 generally were not actionable under classical Roman law.53 
Ulpian suggests that these contracts may, nevertheless, become actionable 
if they have a causa. In Digest 2.14.7.4, Ulpian writes, “when no [causa] 
exists, it is settled that no obligation arises from the agreement.”54 As 
Ulpian explains, the term causa here refers to the fact that one of the 
parties has already performed.55 Thus, if the innominate contract is 
executory, the fact that one party performed will give rise to an action 
demanding that the other party perform.56 
Centuries passed, Roman formalism was abandoned completely, and 
the need for an updated commentary to Ulpian’s text became necessary.57 
Two prominent jurists formulated their decisive theories relying on 
conflicting interpretations of this same passage—the French judge and 
jurist Domat and the German law professor Savigny.  
                                                                                                             
 50. The term refers to the Aristotelian “synallagma,” which means an equal 
trade of performances. See also DIG. 50.16.19 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 11) (using the 
Greek work synallagma to describe a transaction). This term ultimately found its 
way into the Greek, French, and Louisiana civil codes as a synonym for bilateral 
contracts. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1908 (2018). 
 51. Under this type of agreement, the parties exchanged promises to give, do, 
or not do something (do ut des, facio ut facias, do ut facias, and facio ut des). See 
BUCKLAND, MANUAL, supra note 38, § 119; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra 
note 17, § 200. This Roman category of contracts is the precursor to modern 
commutative contracts. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1911.  
 52. The nominate contracts of the classical period included the contracts 
verbis, litteris, re, and consensus. See PETROPOULOS I, supra note 11, at 873–1000 
(providing a detailed discussion of all Roman nominate contracts); Ronald J. 
Scalise, Jr., Classifying and Clarifying Contracts, 76 LA. L. REV. 1063, 1068–72 
(2016) (providing an overview of the Roman categories of contracts). 
 53. See MACKELDEY, supra note 38, §§ 443–448; SCHULZ, supra note 16, at 
522–24; BUCKLAND, TEXTBOOK, supra note 22, at 521–22; GORDLEY, 
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 291.  
 54. See F.P. Walton, Cause and Consideration in Contracts, 41 L. Q. REV. 
306, 312 (1925) (explaining that an innominate contract without a cause is an 
unenforceable nudum pactum).  
 55. Id. at 311. 
 56. See BUCKLAND, PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, No. 104; LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 17, § 205. 
 57. See FILIOS, supra note 17, at 37–73 (discussing in detail the development 
of the notion of cause in the ius commune era).  
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B. European Civil Codes—The French-German Separation  
Domat interpreted Ulpian’s text expansively and enunciated his theory 
of cause, which formed the basis of the French model of unjustified 
enrichment, also applicable in Louisiana.58 Savigny, on the other hand, 
construed this text more narrowly and formulated his theories of 
abstraction and separation, from which the German model of unjustified 
enrichment emerged and was later expanded by German and Greek legal 
scholars.59 
1. The French Model—Causality and Actio de in Rem Verso  
In France and Louisiana, restitution for enrichment without cause is 
restricted to cases in which the several requirements for the actio de in rem 
verso60 are met.61 The Roman condictiones, on the other hand, were not 
developed62 because restoration is achieved through the expanded theories 
of cause and nullity of juridical acts.63 This French model of unjustified 
enrichment traces its roots to Domat’s reading of Ulpian.  
                                                                                                             
 58. Id. at 69–71. 
 59. Id. at 80–86. 
 60. This name was given to the action in a judgment of the Court of Appeal of 
Rennes of August 28, 1820, and, according to several scholars, it should not be 
confused with the action that bore the same name in Rome. See DAWSON, supra 
note 27, at 98 n.101; Paul Roubier, La position française en matière 
d’enrichissement sans cause, in 4 TRAVAUX DE L’ASSOCIATION CAPITANT 38, 44 
(Association H. Capitant ed., 1948); 9bis CHARLES BEUDANT & PAUL LEREBOURS-
PIGEONNIERE, COURS DE DROIT FRANÇAIS No. 1751 n.2 (R. Rodière ed., 2d ed. 
1951–52); Nicholas I, supra note 11, at 619. Nevertheless, it is submitted here that 
the modern actio de in rem verso does bear some similarity with its ancient ancestor, 
predominantly because both refer to restitution as a remedy and are causal in nature. 
See STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 17. 
 61. See LEVASSEUR, supra note 3, at 370–427. 
 62. With the exception of the condictio for a payment of a thing not due 
(condictio indebiti), which was included in the civil codes of Louisiana and 
France. LA. CIV. CODE art. 10 p. 320 (1808); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2279 (1825); LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 2301 (1870); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2299 (rev. 1995); LEVASSEUR, 
supra note 3, at 145–232; CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1376 (1804) 
(Fr.); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1302 (rev. 2016) (Fr.).  
 63. See Roubier, supra note 60, at 42; J.-B. BÉGUET, L’ENRICHISSEMENT 
SANS CAUSE No. 26 (1945); STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra 
note 10, at 18–19. 
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In his treatise,64 Domat enunciates the French theory of cause.65 
Commenting on Ulpian’s passage mentioned above, Domat quickly 
dispenses with the Roman categorization of contracts, and in its place he 
identifies four types of contracts based exclusively on the former 
innominate category66 of the Roman law.67 Referring to the Roman 
category of innominate contracts as controlling in his classification of 
contracts, Domat then directly cites Ulpian in Digest 2.14.7.468 when 
stating that “no [contract69] is obligatory without a causa.”70 Cause, 
therefore, is proclaimed a mandatory requirement for the validity of all 
contracts.71 
At first blush, it seems that the logical sequence of Domat’s reliance 
on Ulpian is faithful and, perhaps, unoriginal.72 A closer examination of 
his treatise reveals, however, that Domat radically departs from Ulpian and 
revolutionizes contract theory in two important respects.73 First, Domat 
furnishes a fundamentally different definition of causa. According to the 
French jurist, causa is not the fact that one of the parties has already 
performed, as Ulpian suggested—rather it is the obligation of the other 
                                                                                                             
 64. JEAN DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER 161 (William 
Strahan trans., Luther Cushing ed., 1853). 
 65. 2 MARCEL PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW, pt. 1, Nos. 1029–32 
(La. State L. Inst. trans., 12th ed. 1959, reprinted 2005) [hereinafter 2 PLANIOL I]; 
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 17, § 209. German and Greek legal 
scholars, on the other hand, recognize several nominate categories of objective 
cause dating back to Roman law. These categories include the following causes: 
to receive a counter-performance from the other party—causa credendi or 
acquirendi; to fulfill a preexisting obligation—causa solvendi; to make a gift, 
liberal cause—causa donandi; to renew an obligation by novation—causa 
novandi; and, arguably, to create a trust—fiduciae causa. See 2 ANDREAS VON 
TUHR, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL DES DEUTSCHEN BÜRGERLICHEN RECHTS II, § 72, 
at 67–80 (1918); GEORGE BALIS, GENIKAI ARCHAI TOU ASTIKOU DIKAIOU 
[GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW] § 34 (8th ed. 1961) (Greece); LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 17, § 245.  
 66. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
 67. DOMAT, supra note 64, at 161; BUCKLAND, TEXTBOOK, supra note 22, at 
522–23. 
 68. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 69. A precise translation from the French original is “covenant.” DOMAT, 
supra note 64, at 161.  
 70. Id. at 161–62.  
 71. See Litvinoff, Cause, supra note 42, at 5–6. 
 72. One author suggests that Domat’s views simply expressed the prevailing 
opinion in French law of that time. See Walton, supra note 54, at 315.  
 73. FILIOS, supra note 17, at 69–71. 
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party to perform.74 This definition accords fully with the meaning of 
objective cause as it is known today.75 The party obligates herself because 
she looks forward to receiving the other party’s performance and not 
because the parties followed a ceremonial form or the other party 
performed first.76  
Second, Domat expressly dismisses Roman formalism and brings 
forward a consensual form of contracting.77 By doing so, he effectively 
broadened the concept of causa by removing it from the strict domain of 
formal validity of contracts and placing it within the purview of the 
doctrine of nullity. Indeed, a contract with no extant and valid cause is an 
absolute nullity.78  
More importantly, and returning to the topic of enrichment without 
cause, Domat cites the excerpts of Justinian’s Digest on condictio sine 
causa79 alongside Ulpian’s passage to support his theory of cause.80 This 
reference has been interpreted to mean that the Roman condictiones are 
instances of an inexistent or faulty causa and, therefore, ought to be 
                                                                                                             
 74. See HENRI CAPITANT, DE LA CAUSE DES OBLIGATIONS 166–67 n.1 (3d ed. 
1927). According to French scholars, Domat’s expansive reading of Ulpian was 
justified because of the elimination of the earlier formal contracts of the classical 
Roman law. See 3 C.B.M. TOULLIER, DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS, TITRE III Nos. 166-
173 (Duvergier ed., 6th ed. 1846–48). On the development of the doctrine of cause 
in French law, see 2 AMBROISE COLIN & HENRI CAPITANT, COURS ÉLEMENTAIRE 
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS No. 57 (Julliott De La Morandiere ed., 8th ed. 1935); 
12 GABRIEL BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & LOUIS J. BARDE, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET 
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, DES OBLIGATIONS, VOL. 1 No. 300 (3d ed. 1906); 6 
MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGES RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL 
FRANÇAIS, DES OBLIGATIONS, PART 1 No. 250 (Paul Esmein et al. eds., 1930).  
 75. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1908 cmt. b (2018) (“The doctrine of 
cause makes the obligations arising out of a bilateral contract correlative. In such 
a contract, indeed, the obligation of each party is the cause of the other.”) 
(emphasis added); CAPITANT, supra note 74, at 6; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, 
supra note 17, §§ 208–209.  
 76. FILIOS, supra note 17, at 69–70. As a result, the causa finalis replaced the 
causa efficiens in contract theory, as Bortolus and Baldus had previously advocated. 
See supra note 17; see also GORDLEY, ORIGINS, supra note 26, at 49–51.  
 77. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 17, § 209. 
 78. DOMAT, supra note 64, at 162, 191; COLIN & CAPITANT, supra note 74, 
No. 62.  
 79. DIG. 12.7 (de condictione sine causa). See supra note 36 and 
accompanying text. 
 80. DOMAT, supra note 64, at 162. See CAPITANT, supra note 74, 166–67 n.1. 
Cf. PETER BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 87 (2003) (arguing in favor of a remedy 
for restitution on the basis of the defendant’s enrichment sine causa).  
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governed by the provisions on nullity.81 This observation admits at least 
one exception—the payment of a thing not due,82 which is treated 
separately under the heading of quasi-contract.83  
Domat’s theory later appeared in the writings of Pothier,84 who in turn 
referred solely to the condictio indebiti as a separate action, thus tacitly 
placing all other condictiones under the scope of the doctrine of nullity.85 
Although Domat’s theory of cause found its way into the civil codes of 
France86 and Louisiana,87 the notion of enrichment without cause remained 
forgotten and uncodified,88 only to be discovered in the 19th and 20th 
centuries in French textbooks89 and the jurisprudence of France and 
                                                                                                             
 81. 2 GABRIEL MARTY & PIERRE RAYNAUD, DROIT CIVIL. LES OBLIGATIONS, 
vol. 1 No. 347 (1962). 
 82. Condictio indebiti. DOMAT, supra note 64, at 595–603. Domat also seems 
to include the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam in his discussion of quasi-
contract, id. at 599, although this type of condictio clearly falls within the ambit 
of unlawful cause. For a definition of these categories of condictio, see supra 
notes 32–36 and accompanying text. 
 83. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1371 (1804) (Fr.); CODE CIVIL [C. 
CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1300 (rev. 2016) (Fr.); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2293 (1870, 
repealed 1995). See LEVASSEUR, supra note 3, at 9–15 (critiquing the concept of 
quasi-contract at civil law).  
 84. See 1 ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, A TREATISE ON OBLIGATIONS 
CONSIDERED IN A MORAL AND LEGAL VIEW 28–33, 72–73 (Francois-Xavier 
Martin trans. 1802, reprinted 1999); DAWSON, supra note 27, at 95–98; 
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 17, §§ 210–211.  
 85. See ANDRE MOREL, L’EVOLUTION DE LA DOCTRINE DE L’ENRICISSEMENT 
SANS CAUSE. ESSAI CRITIQUE 34–36 (1955); ZIMMERMANN, supra note 23, at 883. 
 86. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 1108, 1131–1133 (1804) 
(Fr.). It is noteworthy that the requirement of cause has been removed from the 
French Civil Code in the latest 2016 revision. Though many commentators 
describe this revision as a “revolution,” the concept of cause as a mandatory 
requirement still appears in the revised provisions. See, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] 
[CIVIL CODE] arts. 1162, 1169 (2018) (Fr.); see also Solène Rowan, The New 
French Law of Contract, 66 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 805 (2018). 
 87. LA. CIV. CODE art. 31 p. 264 (1808); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1887 (1825); LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 1893 (1870); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1966 (rev. 1984).  
 88. J.-M. Augustin, Introduction historique à l’enrichissement sans cause en 
droit français, in L’ENRICHISSEMENT SANS CAUSE: LA CLASSIFICATION DES 
SOURCES DES OBLIGATIONS 31 (V. Mannino & C. Ophèle eds. 2007). 
 89. See AUBRY & RAU, supra note 6, No. 578. Their theory on enrichment 
without cause first appeared in the 4th edition of their treatise (1869–1876) and was 
adopted by the French Court of Cassation in the Boudier case. See supra note 3.  
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Louisiana under the heading of quasi-contract.90 Eventually, the 
jurisprudence was codified in Louisiana91 and, quite recently, in France.92  
The implications of Domat’s theory of cause to the foundation and 
scope of application of the modern actio de in rem verso can be understood 
fully in light of the theory of juridical acts.93 In France and Louisiana, all 
patrimonial juridical acts are causal, that is, dependent upon the validity 
                                                                                                             
 90. 2 JACQUES FLOUR, JEAN-LUC AUBERT & ERIC SAVAUX, DROIT CIVIL, LES 
OBLIGATIONS, LE FAIT JURIDIQUE No. 34 (14th ed. 2011) [hereinafter FLOUR ET AL., 
FAIT JURIDIQUE]; FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, PHILIPPE SIMLER & YVES LEQUETTE, DROIT 
CIVIL. LES OBLIGATIONS No. 1063 (11th ed. 2013); PHILIPPE MALAURIE, LAURENT 
AYNES & PHILIPPE STOFFEL-MUNCK, LES OBLIGATIONS No. 1057 (7th ed. 2015). 
 91. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2298 (rev. 1995) (enrichment without cause). 
For a more detailed account of the history of quasi-contract in Louisiana, see 
Barry Nicholas, Unjustified Enrichment in Civil Law and Louisiana Law, Part II, 
37 TUL. L. REV. 49 (1962) [hereinafter Nicholas II]. For an analysis of quasi-
contract under Louisiana law, see LEVASSEUR, supra note 3, at 26–52. 
 92. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] arts. 1303, 1303-1, 1303-2, 1303-3, and 1303-4 (rev. 
2016) (enrichissement injustifié) (Fr.). See Valerio Forti, Enrichissement injustifié, 
Généralités, Conditions matérielles No. 1, JurisClasseur Civil, Art. 1303 à 1304-4, 
Fascicule 10, Jun. 2, 2016 (Dec. 10, 2017). In essence, Louisiana lawyers accomplished 
with one concise article that was drafted more than 20 years ago to codify enrichment 
without cause more efficiently compared to the five new and debated articles in the 
French Civil Code. On this topic, the student has become the teacher!  
 93. A juridical act is defined as a “manifestation [or declaration] of will intended 
to have legal consequences.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 492 cmt. b (2018). A juridical 
act “may be a unilateral act, such as an affidavit, or a bilateral act, such as a contract. 
It may be onerous or gratuitous.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3471 cmt. c. According to 
Litvinoff and Tête, based on a systematic categorization of civilian topics, juridical 
acts can be patrimonial or extra-patrimonial—personal. Patrimonial juridical acts are 
those that involve  
the creation, modification o[r] extinction of rights of a pecuniary value . 
. . . Thus, a sale . . . or the letting out of services for a fee or stipend, are 
examples of juridical acts that are patrimonial. Those juridical acts are 
extra-patrimonial which involve rights that escape a pecuniary 
evaluation, or, to use a different technical terminology, are out of 
commerce. Such is the case with family rights and the so-called rights of 
personality. Thus, marriage, adoption, emancipation, are all examples. 
SAÚL LITVINOFF & W. THOMAS TÊTE, LOUISIANA LEGAL TRANSACTIONS: THE 
CIVIL LAW OF JURIDICAL ACTS 140 (1969); 1 MARCEL PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE 
CIVIL LAW pt. 1, Nos. 264–66 (La. State L. Inst. trans., 12th ed. 1959, reprinted 
2005) [hereinafter 1 PLANIOL I]; 1 BERNHARD WINDSCHEID, LEHRBUCH DES 
PANDEKTENRECHTS, ALLGEMEINER TEIL § 69 (Theodor Kipp ed., 8th ed. 1900); 
BALIS, supra note 65, § 32.  
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of their cause.94 In principle, patrimonial juridical acts are also unified95 in 
the sense that they combine personal elements—for example, a promise to 
transfer ownership—and real elements—for example, conveyance of the 
object of the contract.96 Nullity of the juridical act is retroactive,97 meaning 
that the parties’ patrimonies are restored to the situation that existed prior 
to the formation of the null act.98 In the example of a null contract of sale, 
ownership of the thing sold reverts back to the seller, and the buyer’s 
                                                                                                             
 94. 2 PLANIOL I, supra note 65, Nos. 1042–46. 
 95. With reference to a contract of sale, see id. No. 1416. 
 96. As noted, civilian doctrine classifies juridical acts into several categories, 
depending on different factors. Based on their object, patrimonial juridical acts, 
for example, can be personal or real. As Professor Yiannopoulos explained,  
Personal juridical acts are those that create, transfer, alter or terminate 
obligations. Real juridical acts are those that create, transfer, alter, or 
terminate real rights. . . . Quite frequently, both kinds of juridical acts 
are combined in a single transaction. The sale of property, for example, 
involves a personal juridical act—the promise to transfer ownership, as 
well as a real juridical act—the delivery or transfer of possession. 
A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, LOUISIANA AND COMPARATIVE LAW 
449 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM]. Depending 
on their effects, patrimonial juridical acts can be promissory or dispositive.  
A promissory juridical act contains merely a promise to render a 
performance and gives rise to an obligation to give, to do, or not to do 
something . . . . A dispositive juridical act effects a disposition, namely, 
a transfer, alteration, encumbrance, or termination of a right . . . . The 
notion of a personal juridical act is broader than that of a dispositive 
juridical act. Indeed, a personal juridical act may involve the transfer or 
termination of an obligation, namely, a disposition, as in the case of the 
remission of a debt. 
Id. (emphasis added). These categories must be examined separately; however, 
there is a degree of overlap between them. All real juridical acts are dispositive. 
All promissory juridical acts are personal. Most personal juridical acts are 
promissory but not all. 
 97. In other words, a juridical act is null ex tunc. In some instances, however, a 
prospective, ex nunc, effect of nullity coupled with an award for damages is 
warranted. Such is the case, for example, in contracts of continuous or periodic 
performance like a lease. Because restoration in kind obviously is impracticable, an 
award of damages ought to be granted instead. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2033 para. 
1 (2018). This principle also appears in the Louisiana Civil Code for cases of 
dissolution of contracts and effects of conditions. Id. arts. 1776, 2019. See SAÚL 
LITVINOFF, LAW OF OBLIGATIONS § 5.12, in 5 LOUISIANA. CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2d 
ed. 2001) [hereinafter LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL].  
 98. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2033. 
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ownership of the tendered price is restored.99 Because of the retroactive 
effects of nullity, the putative buyer is now possessing or detaining a thing 
that she no longer owns.100 Thus, the putative seller is entitled to bring a 
real action to revendicate the thing in the hands of the putative buyer.101 It 
should be clear that an action for enrichment without cause would be 
inadmissible in this case. The reason for this inadmissibility is that the 
general rule prohibiting enrichment without cause must yield to the more 
specific rules of nullity and subsequent revendication.102 The French 
approach of unity and causality initially focuses on the protection of the 
contracting parties and then affords protection to third parties when 
necessary.103 
As a result, in Louisiana and France, the modern doctrines of cause104 
and nullity105 govern situations of restoration with the exception of the 
quasi-contractual claim for restoration of a payment of a thing not due.106 
Delictual actions lie for the recovery of damages as a result of an offense or 
a quasi-offense.107 The remaining cases of restitution may fall within the 
purview of an actio de in rem verso, that is, enrichment without cause.108  
The fact remained, however, that the actio de in rem verso dwelled 
outside the civil codes and legal theories of France and Louisiana. When 
this action was discovered in the seminal French arrêt Boudier of the 
French Cour de cassation,109 it was received with skepticism by scholars, 
                                                                                                             
 99. Id. The same result is obtained in the case of dissolution of the sale. Id. art. 
2018; DIAN TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & DAVID W. GRUNING, SALES §§ 15:9, 15:16, in 
24 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2012). 
 100. Art. 2033. See YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 13:14. 
 101. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 526; see YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 
18, §§ 11:7, 13:7, 13:13. 
 102. According to a long-standing maxim, lex specialis derogat lege generali, 
meaning “the special law overrides the general law.” See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL 
LAW SYSTEM, supra note 96, at 239. 
 103. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2035. See Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Rethinking the 
Doctrine of Nullity, 74 LA. L. REV. 663, 684–85 (2014) (discussing the effect of 
nullity on third persons). 
 104. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1966. 
 105. Id. art. 2029. 
 106. Id. art. 2299. 
 107. Id. art. 2315. See YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 13:13.  
 108. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2298. 
 109. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] req., June 15, 
1892, D. 1892, 1, 596, S. 1893, 1, 281, note J.-E. Labbé (Fr.) (impoverished provider 
of fertilizer performed at the request of an agricultural lessee on the land of the 
enriched lessor and subsequently claimed compensation from the lessor after the 
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starting with Labbé, who was the first to criticize the decision for its overly 
broad and “dangerous” application of a general principle of law.110 The 
courts were receptive to this criticism and added juridical requirements to 
the admissibility of the action, thus restricting and demoting it to a 
subsidiary action.111 Several contemporary French scholars believe that 
this restrictive trend has perhaps gone too far, and the action has been 
unduly constrained.112 The same can be said with regard to the seminal 
Louisiana Supreme Court decisions in Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc.113 
                                                                                                             
lessee became insolvent). For a detailed discussion of this case, see Nicholas I, supra 
note 11, at 622–24. 
 110. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] req., June 
15, 1892, D. 1892, 1, 596, S. 1893, 1, 281, note J.-E. Labbé (Fr.); see also ALAIN 
BÉNABENT, DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS No. 484 (14th ed. 2014); Nicholas I, supra 
note 11, at 624–26. 
 111. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] civ., May 
12, 1914, S. 1918, 1, 41, note Nayret (Fr.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court 
for judicial matters] civ., Mar. 2 1915, D. 1920, 1, 102 (Fr.). 
 112. FLOUR ET AL., FAIT JURIDIQUE, supra note 90, No. 56; see also MALAURIE 
ET AL., supra note 90, No. 1058 (arguing that the contours of unjust enrichment 
have been perhaps unduly restricted to a particular category of persons, including 
those persons who have common interests within the outskirts of a legal 
patrimonial relationship, such as unmarried partners, spouses under a separate 
property regime, a child attending to an elderly parent, and parties to an inexistent 
contract). According to Dawson, the inherent suspicion toward jurisprudential 
rules may have been an additional factor prompting an undue restriction of this 
action. See DAWSON, supra note 27, at 105 (“[I]t is a difficult matter for courts to 
introduce large-scale correctives, by case law methods, into a system of codified 
law.”). Nevertheless, it should be remembered that jurisprudence constante is a 
venerated civilian institution and, at least in theory and by some courts, a 
recognized primary source of law in the form of a custom. See YIANNOPOULOS, 
CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 96, at 149–52. In any event, codification of this 
action in Louisiana and France has rendered this debate moot.  
 113. Minyard v. Curtis Prods., Inc., 205 So. 2d 422 (1967) (providing that a 
subcontractor brought contractual “action in indemnity” against a third party whose 
fault triggered the payment of damages in the absence of another remedy at law). For 
a detailed commentary to the decision, see LEVASSEUR, supra note 3, at 403–08; Saúl 
Litvinoff, Work of the Appellate Courts—1976–1968, Obligations, 29 LA. L. REV. 200 
(1969) [hereinafter Litvinoff, Appellate Courts]; Albert Tate, The Louisiana Action 
for Unjustified Enrichment, 50 TUL. L. REV. 883 (1976) [hereinafter Tate I]; Albert 
Tate, The Louisiana Action for Unjustified Enrichment. A Study in Judicial Process, 
51 TUL. L. REV. 446 (1977) [hereinafter Tate II]; John St. Claire, Actio de in Rem 
Verso in Louisiana: Minyard v. Curtis Products Inc., 43 TUL. L. REV. 263 (1969); 
Robert Fritz, Note, Sales—Article 1965—Civil Law Action of Unjust Enrichment: De 
in Rem Verso, 14 LOY. L. REV. 434 (1968). It is noteworthy that the Court based its 
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and Edmonston v. A-Second Mortgage Co.114 A proper understanding of 
the historical foundations and the general principles of enrichment without 
cause should eliminate tendencies to broaden unduly or restrict the scope 
of application of this remedy. The French/Louisiana approach also is better 
understood if compared with the German/Greek model of unjustified 
enrichment.  
2. The German Model—Abstraction and Condictio  
Ulpian’s passage115 received a different reading and commentary 
under the German jurist Savigny.116 While Domat adopted an expansive 
reading of Ulpian’s excerpt, Savigny construed this passage quite 
narrowly.117 Savigny noted that Ulpian’s passage referred only to the 
innominate contracts and not to the nominate contract of stipulatio.118 
                                                                                                             
decision on the general provisions of the 1870 Civil Code on equity—former Articles 
21 and 1965, current Articles 4 and 2055—and not on the more germane provisions 
on quasi-contracts—former Articles 2293 and 2294, which were repealed in the 1995 
revision. See Barry Nicholas, The Louisiana Law of Unjustified Enrichment Through 
the Act of the Person Enriched, 6 TUL. CIV. L. F. 3, 10–13 (1991–1992) [hereinafter 
Nicholas III]; Tate I, supra, at 894 (arguing in favor of basing the action on former 
Article 21); Tate II, supra, at 458–60 (discussing the difficulties associated with 
basing the action on former Article 21). Codification of this action now renders this 
point moot. But see Bruce V. Schewe & Vanessa Richelle, The “New and 
Improved” Claim for Unjust Enrichment—Codified, 56 LA. L. REV. 663, 669 
(arguing in favor of the subsidiarity principle on the basis of Article 4 of the 
Louisiana Civil Code on equity).  
 114. Edmonston v. A-Second Mortg. Co., 289 So. 2d 116 (La. 1974) (describing 
how landowner brought action of enrichment without cause against second 
mortgagee when first mortgage was discharged by payment of life insurance 
benefits). For a detailed commentary, see LEVASSEUR, supra note 3, at 408–11; 
Stewart McCaa Thomas, Conditions For the Application of Actio De In Rem Verso, 
36 LA. L. REV. 312 (1975); Charles Verderame, Unjust Enrichment Remedy: Actio 
de in rem verso, 21 LOY. L. REV. 219 (1975).  
 115. DIG. 2.14.7.4 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 4). See supra note 48 and 
accompanying text. 
 116. 2 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, DAS OBLIGATIONENRECHT ALS TEIL 
DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN RECHTS 249, 253–54 (1853) [hereinafter SAVIGNY, 
OBLIGATIONS]; ARCHIBALD BROWN, AN EPITOME AND ANALYSIS OF SAVIGNY’S 
TREATISE ON OBLIGATIONS IN ROMAN LAW 122–24 (1872). 
 117. SAVIGNY, OBLIGATIONS, supra note 116, at 249, 253–54; BROWN, supra 
note 116, at 122–24. 
 118. The stipulatio was the most widely known and used nominate contract. 
Originally, it was a verbal (verbis) contract formed in a ceremony of a question 
and answer between the parties. Later, the stipulatio was designated a mandatory 
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From this, Savigny posited that the stipulatio is an abstract contract, that 
is, a contract that is valid notwithstanding the invalidity or inexistence of 
its causa.119 This radical proposition laid the foundation for the recognition 
of abstract juridical acts120 in the German and Greek civilian systems under 
the principle of abstraction.121  
Based on this observation of the abstract nature of the stipulatio, 
Savigny then turned his attention to the traditio. Under Roman law, 
traditio was the act of delivery of a corporeal thing.122 Traditio was a 
causal act in the classical period123 but had become abstract by the time of 
the Corpus Iuris Civilis.124 Faithful to the Roman system, Savigny 
distinguished sharply between the promissory element of a transaction and 
the dispositive element of the same transaction, thus enunciating the 
famous theory of separation.125 Savigny then characterized the traditio as 
                                                                                                             
written form. See WATSON, supra note 14, at 1–9; SCHULZ, supra note 16, at 473–
83; PETROPOULOS I, supra note 11, at 873–86; GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS, supra 
note 17, at 290. 
 119. SAVIGNY, OBLIGATIONS, supra note 116, at 249, 253–54; BROWN, supra 
note 116, at 122–24; ZIMMERMANN, supra note 23, at 91–92. 
 120. A juridical act is abstract when the validity of the act is independent of 
the validity or existence of its cause. Most promissory juridical acts are causal. 
Conveyance of movables, assignment of rights, and remission of debts are popular 
examples of abstract dispositive juridical acts that remain valid notwithstanding 
the invalidity of their cause. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 
96, at 449–51; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 17, § 248.  
 121. “Abstraktionsprinzip.” See FILIOS, supra note 17, at 80–86; BASIL 
MARKESINIS ET AL., THE GERMAN LAW OF CONTRACT, A COMPARATIVE 
TREATISE 27–37 (2d ed. 2006); ZIMMERMANN, supra note 23, at 866–68.  
 122. The term “tradition” is used in contemporary civilian theory and its 
application appears in modern civil codes. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 
722, 2477 (2018). 
 123. A valid cause of tradition, iusta causa traditionis, was required for the 
validity of the transfer of a thing. PETROPOULOS I, supra note 11, at 676–78.  
 124. Id.; see also DIG. 41.1.9.3 (Gaius, Rerum Cottidianarum sive Aureorum 
2); J. INST. 2.1.40 (accepting the validity of a transfer of property without 
reference to an underlying cause). 
 125. “Trennungsprinzip.” See 3 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES 
HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN RECHTS 312–13 (1840); see also J.B. MOYLE, THE 
CONTRACT OF SALE IN THE CIVIL LAW 3, 110, 135 (1892, reprinted 1994) 
(discussing the difference between the Roman promissory concept of sale with 
the English sale as an “ipso facto transfer of property” and citing DIG. 50.16.67 
and CODE JUST. 2.3.20); ZIMMERMANN, supra note 23, at 271–72. The promissory 
act usually serves as the principal and objective cause of the dispositive act, while, 
through the dispositive act, the obligation incurred in the promissory act is 
discharged. See MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 121, at 27–37. 
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a dispositive and abstract juridical act and the stipulatio as a promissory 
and abstract juridical act.126  
The potential inequities produced by the disassociation of cause from 
the validity of these abstract juridical acts are mitigated by recourse to the 
doctrine of unjustified enrichment.127 Savigny postulated that the several 
Roman abstract condictiones, if read together, stand for the proposition of 
a general action of unjustified enrichment as a condictio generalis, which 
ought to be available if the actual cause of an abstract juridical act is 
inexistent or invalid.128 
Savigny’s theory was commented on and further elaborated by Jhering 
and was eventually incorporated in the modern German and Greek civil 
law.129 As a result, the concept of unjustified enrichment is considerably 
broader and more frequently invoked in Germany and Greece to address 
issues of restitution as well as restoration for failed juridical acts.130 
German and Greek legal doctrines base their theory of unjustified 
enrichment on the Roman condictiones from which a general action of 
                                                                                                             
 126. SAVIGNY, OBLIGATIONS, supra note 116, at 255–77 and note m. On the 
distinction between promissory and dispositive juridical acts, see supra note 96. 
In essence, if an abstract juridical act involving transfer of property fails upon 
performance, the transferee will maintain ownership of the thing. See MICHAEL 
STATHOPOULOS, CONTRACT LAW IN GREECE 50 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter 
STATHOPOULOS, CONTRACT LAW]. 
 127. BALIS, supra note 65, § 65. 
 128. 5 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN 
RECHTS 503, 522–23, 526–27, 567 (1841); Nicholas I, supra note 11, at 611. As 
Professor Yiannopoulos explained,  
A debtor sued for the performance of obligations undertaken by [an 
abstract] juridical act may not defend the action on the ground that the 
juridical act was without cause or that its cause was immoral or illegal. 
The harshness of this solution is mitigated by application of the principle 
of enrichment without cause. In certain circumstances, the debtor may 
avoid performance of an obligation he has assumed by raising the 
exception of lack or unlawfulness of cause and, if he performed, he may 
reclaim whatever he paid by an action grounded on the unjustified 
enrichment of the defendant. 
YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 96, at 450. 
 129. See FILIOS, supra note 17, at 83; MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 121, at 
11–13. The German approach of separation and abstraction is aimed initially at 
protecting third parties and the public trust but also endeavors to protect the 
contracting parties when deemed necessary. See DIETER MEDICUS, ALLGEMEINER 
TEIL DES BGB, No. 226 (8th ed. 2002); STATHOPOULOS, CONTRACT LAW, supra 
note 126, at 50–51.  
 130. See 1 MAX KASER, DAS RÖMISCHE PRIVATRECHT § 139.3 (2d ed. 1971). 
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unjustified enrichment131 appeared in the German132 and Greek133 civil 
codes. Nevertheless, several German scholars134 questioned the effectiveness 
of a unitary remedy to govern such a multitude of cases.135 Following this 
trend, German legal doctrine distinguishes between several nominate types of 
enrichment.136  
The two most prominent German categories of enrichment are enrichment 
because of a performance rendered by the obligor to the obligee137 and 
enrichment occurring in some other way.138 Proponents of this categorization 
also argued in favor of the application of a different subset of rules for each 
category.139 This strict categorization of the types of enrichment only prompted 
further debate and was not particularly helpful for the courts.140 
One celebrated example of the overcomplicated German doctrine of 
unjustified enrichment is the “air-travel case.”141 A 17-year-old boy 
                                                                                                             
 131. See STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 20–22. 
 132. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 812 (2018) (Ger.); 
Martin Schwab, in 5 MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGELICHEN GESETZBUCH 
§ 812 (Franz Jürgen Säcker et al. eds., 6th ed. 2013); GERHARD DANNEMANN, 
THE GERMAN LAW OF UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT 3–20 (2009); ZIMMERMANN, 
supra note 23, at 887–91 (1990, reprinted 1992).  
 133. ASTIKOS KODIKAS [AK] [CIVIL CODE] art. 904 (2018) (Greece); Michael 
Stathopoulos, Arthro 904 [Article 904], in 4 ASTIKOS KODIX, KAT’ ARTHRO 
ERMINEIA, EIDIKO ENOCHIKO [CIVIL CODE COMMENTARY, SPECIAL LAW OF 
OBLIGATIONS] (Apostolos Georgiades & Michael Stathopoulos eds., 1982) 
(Greece); STATHOPOULOS, CONTRACT LAW, supra note 126, at 243–57.  
 134. Most notably, see WALTER WILBERG, DIE LEHRE VON DER 
UNGERECHTFERTIGEN BEREICHERUNG NACH ÖSTERREICHISCHEM UND DEUTSCHEM 
RECHT—KRITIK UND AUFBAU (1934); Ernst von Caemmerer, Grundprobleme des 
Bereicherungsrechts, in ERNST VON CAEMMERER: GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN 370 (H.G. 
Leser ed., 1968); Ernst von Caemmerer, Problèmes Fondamentaux de l’enrichissement 
sans Cause, 18 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARÉ 573 (1966).  
 135. See GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 419–21, 426–32; 
STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 22–27; Nicholas I, 
supra note 11, at 614–17. 
 136. See DANNEMANN, supra note 132, at 21–44; BIRKE HÄCKER, 
CONSEQUENCES OF IMPAIRED CONSENT TRANSFERS 25–35 (2009). 
 137. “Leistungskondiktion.” See DANNEMANN, supra note 132, at 45–74.  
 138. “Nichtleistungskondiktion.” See id. at 87–122. This broad subcategory 
encompasses cases of restitution not based on performance rendered by the impoverished 
obligee. The most notable example is the enrichment occurring from the enriched obligor’s 
interference with the impoverished obligee’s patrimony (Eingriffskondiktion). Id. 
 139. See STATHOPOULOS, CONTRACT LAW, supra note 126, at 247–48. 
 140. Id. 
 141. “Flugreisefall.” Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 7, 
1971 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 609, 1971 (Ger.). Partial translation 
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somehow managed to board a flight from Hamburg to New York without a 
valid ticket.142 His plot was unraveled when the aircraft arrived in New 
York, and immigration officials denied him admission into the United 
States.143 The airline then presented a written agreement to the boy to fly 
him back to Germany.144 The boy signed the agreement, and when he 
returned to Germany, he refused to pay.145 The airline brought suit against 
his parents.146 Under German law, the contract signed by the minor for the 
return flight was absolutely null;147 the airline did maintain a claim, 
however, against the parents on the basis of negotiorum gestio for the return 
flight to Germany.148 But what about the outbound flight to New York? The 
court found that the boy had been unjustly enriched at the expense of the 
airline.149 The boy’s parents were ordered to make restitution for the cost of 
the airfare regardless of the fact that the boy did not retain his enrichment150 
and that he was a minor.151  
                                                                                                             
available in DANNEMANN, supra note 132, at 242–49; see also MARKESINIS ET AL., 
supra note 121, at 235–36.  
 142. DANNEMANN, supra note 132, at 242–45; MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 
121, at 235–36. 
 143. DANNEMANN, supra note 132, at 242–45; MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 
121, at 235–36. 
 144. DANNEMANN, supra note 132, at 242–45; MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 
121, at 235–36. 
 145. DANNEMANN, supra note 132, at 242–45; MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 
121, at 235–36. 
 146. DANNEMANN, supra note 132, at 242–45; MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 
121, at 235–36. 
 147. DANNEMANN, supra note 132, at 245–49; MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 
121, at 235–36. In Louisiana, the contract would be relatively null at the behest 
of the minor. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1919, 2031 (2018).  
 148. DANNEMANN, supra note 132, at 245–49; MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 
121, at 235–36; cf. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2292. 
 149. MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 121, at 236. 
 150. Id. (“[A] change of position . . . cannot be invoked if the debtor knew that 
he was not entitled to the service.”). The problem of change of position concerns 
the consequences of the action of enrichment without cause, which are not examined 
in this Article. See generally James Gordley, Restitution without enrichment? 
Change of position and Wegfall der Bereicherung, in UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, 
KEY ISSUES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 227 (David Johnston & Reinhard 
Zimmermann eds., 2002); GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 433–44.  
 151. MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 121, at 236. The facts of this case clearly 
indicate an enrichment and a corresponding impoverishment. Yet these facts still 
prompted extended controversy among German commentators as to the precise nature 
of the enrichment. Was this flight “provided” to the boy by the airline or did the boy 
“interfere” with the airline’s patrimony? Was the airline actually impoverished? 
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Greek legal doctrine has followed a more flexible and practical 
approach.152 Based on German theory, Greek scholars acknowledge three 
basic types of enrichment: (1) performance or other benefit conferred on the 
enriched obligor at the expense of the impoverished obligee; (2) enriched 
obligor’s interference with the impoverished obligee’s patrimony; and (3) 
expenses incurred by the impoverished obligee on the property of the 
enriched obligor.153 The same scholars recognize, however, that these 
categories are flexible, may overlap, and are intended solely for practical 
use and ease of reference rather than strict categorizations warranting a 
separate regulation.154 This approach will be used when discussing the 
requirements for the action of enrichment without cause.  
A comparison of the French and German models of unjustified 
enrichment will become more evident by reference to an example: if X 
sells her bicycle to Y and, upon delivery of the bicycle, X discovers that 
the cause of the contract of sale was false155 or illegal,156 X can bring an 
action for annulment of the contract.157 In France and Louisiana, the 
juridical act of sale typically encompasses both the promise to transfer 
ownership and the conveyance of the bicycle. The validity of the cause is 
a mandatory requirement for the validity of this sale. As a result of the 
nullity of the contract of sale, ownership of the bicycle will revert back to 
X, who can now revendicate the bicycle in Y’s hands by instituting a real 
action and not an action for enrichment without cause. 
In Germany and Greece, however, this transaction contains two 
distinguishable juridical acts—the promise to sell and the dispositive act of 
conveyance. The dispositive act is abstract and, therefore, nondependent 
upon the validity of the promissory act of sale. Invalidity of the former act 
therefore will not affect the validity of the latter act. Thus, Y remains owner 
of the bicycle and is immune to any real actions for its recovery. But because 
                                                                                                             
Obviously the boy took an empty seat on the airplane—a seat that was not reserved or 
used by anyone else. Finally, what was the boy’s enrichment? Did he retain this 
enrichment, having been flown back to Germany? Cases such as this one illustrate the 
futility of the attempt to strictly categorize the cases of enrichment. In Louisiana, these 
facts would possibly fall within the scope of the tort of conversion and, therefore, a 
delictual action would be available. See infra notes 239, 241. 
 152. STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 37–39. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1948 (2018). 
 156. Id. art. 1968. 
 157. Naturally, if the contract is relatively null, the action is for rescission of 
the contract. If the contract is absolutely null, an action for a declaratory judgment 
is initiated. See id. arts. 2030, 2032.  
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Y has no just cause to retain this enrichment in her patrimony, X will be 
entitled to reclaim the bicycle on grounds of unjustified enrichment. 
From this illustration, it should become clear that both systems 
provide for the recovery of property that has been conveyed without “just 
cause.” Each system, however, arrives at this result via different routes. 
What is accomplished by the German approach of unjustified enrichment 
is equally achieved by the French doctrines of cause and nullity. In other 
words, the German device of unjustified enrichment is broader than the 
French enrichment without cause. Conversely, the French doctrines of 
cause and nullity are broader than the German theory of invalidity of 
juridical acts. Understanding the history and characteristics of the 
French/Louisiana model of enrichment without cause will prove useful 
when formulating the general principles for the application of this remedy.  
II. SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF ENRICHMENT WITHOUT CAUSE  
The second mystery to be explored is the precise scope of application of 
the theory of enrichment without cause. Louisiana and French courts have 
delineated this scope of application by enunciating several requirements for 
this remedy. This jurisprudence has been codified.158 These requirements are 
explored with reference to general principles drawn from the characteristics 
of the French model of enrichment without cause. Discussion refers to 
Louisiana jurisprudence and solutions reached by French courts. German and 
Greek ideas compatible with the French/Louisiana model are also used. 
A. General Principles  
Solving the first mystery concerning the foundation of the theory of 
enrichment without cause reveals three characteristic features of this theory: 
(1) the general and residual character of the remedy; (2) the legal source of 
the obligation; and (3) the concept of restitution. Exploring and understanding 
these features is necessary before addressing the requirements for application 
of the theory of enrichment without cause.  
1. Enrichment Without Cause as Lex Generalis  
The first principle derived from the characteristics of the French/Louisiana 
model of enrichment without cause is the general nature of the remedy.159 
Courts steadily characterize enrichment without cause as a “gap-filling” device 
of equitable origin, having exceptional application, pursuant to a judicially 
                                                                                                             
 158. Id. art. 2298. 
 159. See Nicholas I, supra note 11, at 606–07. 
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crafted principle of substantive subsidiarity.160 Perhaps a more accurate 
description of this characteristic feature can be found in the civilian maxim 
of statutory construction, lex posterior generalis non derogat priori 
speciali.161 As discussed above, the French approach to enrichment 
without cause focused primarily on the doctrines of cause and nullity of 
juridical acts. Nevertheless, enrichment without cause was given 
exceptional application, which, according to another civilian maxim, 
exceptio est strictissimae interpretationis,162 should be interpreted strictly. 
Therefore, application of the provision of Article 2298 of the Louisiana Civil 
Code must yield to more specific rules on cause, nullity, and dissolution of 
juridical acts, as well as legal rules on delictual or quasi-delictual liability. 
In essence, expression of the general principle of unjustified enrichment 
is found in the doctrines of cause and nullity as well as in the concept of 
enrichment without cause. When it comes to restoration, the former rules 
are lex specialis.  
2. Enrichment Without Cause as a Juridical Fact  
Scholars have advanced several theories concerning the legal nature 
of enrichment without cause.163 These theories can be separated into two 
broad categories. The first category includes theories claiming that 
enrichment without cause is a form of quasi-delict, generating legal 
obligations on the basis of the acts of the enriched obligor.164 The second 
                                                                                                             
 160. Walters v. MedSouth Record Mgmt., L.L.C., 38 So. 3d 243, 244 (La. 2010) 
(citing Mouton v. State, 525 So. 2d 1136, 1142 (La. Ct. App. 1988)); Bd. of Sup’rs 
of La. State Univ. v. La. Agric. Fin. Auth., 984 So. 2d 72 (La. Ct. App. 2008); see 
also Carriere v. Bank of La., 702 So. 2d 648, 657 (La. 1996); Coastal Env’t 
Specialists, Inc. v. Chem-Lig Intern., Inc., 818 So. 2d 12, 19 (La. Ct. App. 2001) 
(“[W]here there is a rule of law directed to the issue, an action must not be allowed 
to defeat the purpose of said rule. . . . Stated differently, unjust enrichment principles 
are only applicable to fill a gap in the law where no express remedy is provided.”). 
 161. A posterior general law does not abrogate the provisions of a prior special 
law. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 96, at 239.  
 162. Exceptional provisions are not susceptible of expansive interpretation or 
analogous application. See id. at 258. 
 163. SAÚL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 259, in 7 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 
(1975) [hereinafter LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS II]; André Rouast, L’enrichissement 
sans cause et la jurisprudence civile, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL [RTDCIV] 
1922, p. 35. 
 164. See 2 PLANIOL I, supra note 65, No. 937; Litvinoff, Appellate Courts, 
supra note 113, at 207–08; Georges Ripert & Michel Teisseire, Essai d’une 
théorie de l’enrichissement sans cause, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 
[RTDCIV] 1904, p. 727 (arguing that the legal basis for unjustified enrichment can 
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category comprises theories proposing that enrichment without cause is 
quasi-contractual in form, thus generating an obligation as if there were 
an implied contract between enriched obligor and impoverished obligee.165 
The quasi-delictual theories are historically more accurate and closer 
to the true and original legal nature of the Roman law condictiones.166 
These theories, however, focus too much on the subjective element of the 
obligor’s behavior, thus failing to account for cases in which the obligor 
is held strictly liable for her enrichment.167 The quasi-contractual theories 
                                                                                                             
be found in the theory of risks); Stephen Smith, Unjust Enrichment: Nearer to 
Tort than Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT 181 (Robert Chambers et al. eds., 2009); Reihnard Zimmermann, 
Unjustified Enrichment: The Modern Civilian Approach, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 403, 403–04 (“The law of unjustified enrichment, in a way, is the mirror 
image of the law of delict.”). 
 165. Aubry and Rau adopted this approach by advancing their special theory 
of balancing the patrimonies between the enriched obligor and the impoverished 
obligee. See AUBRY & RAU, supra note 6, No. 578; see also Nicholas III, supra 
note 113, at 6–10 (discussing the dilemma between delict and quasi-contract in 
the pre-Minyard Louisiana jurisprudence). 
 166. See STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 4–6 
(explaining that the early condictiones were focused solely on the act of 
enrichment and sanctioned an illicit misappropriation of wealth). 
 167. 2 PLANIOL I, supra note 65, No. 938; BEUDANT & LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIÈRE, 
supra note 60, No. 1759; 2 GEORGES RIPERT & JEAN BOULANGER, TRAITÉ 
ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL No. 1275 (1952); 7 MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGES 
RIPERT, DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS, LES OBLIGATIONS, PT. 2, No. 752 (Paul Esmein et al. 
eds., 1931); 2 LOUIS JOSSERAND, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL POSITIF FRANÇAIS No. 758 (3d 
ed. 1939) (all arguing that admissibility of the actio de in rem verso is independent of 
the capacity or incapacity of the defendant). Protection of the incapable obligor is 
warranted, however, when assessing the effect of a successful claim of enrichment 
without cause. It has been suggested that in the case of an incapable enrichee, restitution 
ought to be made on the assets that remain in the hands of the enrichee, if there is no 
fraud on his part. See 2 HENRI MAZEAUD ET AL., LEÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL, VOL. 1, 
OBLIGATIONS, THEORIE GENERALE No. 711 (François Chabas ed., 8th ed. 1991).  
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appeared later and prevailed in doctrine,168 jurisprudence,169 and the 
law.170 The real difficulty with this group of theories lies in the imperfect, 
and much debated, definition of the term “quasi-contract.”171 Further, this 
group of theories focuses mainly on the objective factor of enrichment 
                                                                                                             
 168. Unjustified enrichment has been compared to a special and implied type of 
loan between the borrower-obligor and the lender-obligee. See LITVINOFF, 
OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 17, § 199, at 360; MARTY & RAYNAUD, supra note 81, 
No. 623 (citing French writers who have characterized the payment of a thing not due 
as a particular quasi-contract pro mutuum); see also WILLIAM W. BUCKLAND, THE 
MAIN INSTITUTIONS OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW § 107 (1931, reprinted 1994). Other 
scholars have understood unjustified enrichment as an abnormal negotiorum gestio. 
See 31 CHARLES DEMOLOMBE, COURS DE CODE NAPOLEON, No. 49 (2d ed. 1882). 
The French jurisprudence initially followed this approach, but it was quickly 
dismissed by French doctrine. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for 
judicial matters] req., July 16, 1890, D. 1891, 1, 49, note M. Planiol, S. 1894, 1, 19 
(Fr.); FLOUR ET AL., FAIT JURIDIQUE, supra note 90, No. 35. On the quasi-contractual 
nature of negotiorum gestio, see Coastal Env’t Specialists, Inc. v. Chem-Lig Intern., 
Inc., 818 So. 2d 12, 20 (La. Ct. App. 2001); City of Shreveport v. Caddo Parish, 658 
So. 2d 786, 795–96 (La. Ct. App. 1995). On the differences between negotiorum 
gestio and enrichment without cause, see JOHN DENSON SMITH, LOUISIANA AND 
COMPARATIVE MATERIALS ON CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS 417–18 (4th ed. 1973). 
 169. Canal/Claiborne, LTD v. Stonehedge Dev., L.L.C., 156 So. 3d 627, 633–
34 (La. 2014) (“That a claim of enrichment without cause under La. Civ. Code 
art. 2298 is a quasi-contractual claim is well-settled in our jurisprudence.”); Arc 
Indus., L.L.C.. v. Nungesser, 970 So. 2d 690, 694–95 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (holding 
that a quasi-contractual claim of enrichment without cause is sufficient to support 
the application of LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 76.1 on venue); Our Lady of the Lake 
Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Helms, 754 So. 2d 1049, 1052 (La. Ct. App. 1999).  
 170. See SMITH, supra note 168, at 417–19 (discussing the introduction of the 
notion of quasi-contract and enrichment without cause in French and Louisiana law).  
 171. The Mazeaud brothers concur with Josserand in saying that quasi-contract is 
a “legendary monster that should be banished from the juridical vocabulary.” 
JOSSERAND, supra note 167, No. 10; MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 167, No. 649. 
Mousourakis prefers a more subtle renunciation of this term, calling it 
“unsatisfactory.” GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 
239 (2012). Levasseur and Terré et al. also aptly note that the Latin term “quasi ex 
contractu nasci videntur” refers not to a source of the obligation but to the effect of 
such an obligation “as if a contract were formed.” See LEVASSEUR, supra note 3, at 
9–15; TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 90, No. 1026. The Louisiana Legislature acted wisely 
in removing this term from the civil code. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2292–2293 (1870, 
repealed 1995). Interestingly, the term still remains in the revised French Civil Code. 
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1376 (1804) (Fr.); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL 
CODE] art. 1302 (rev. 2016) (Fr.).  
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without inquiring into the subjective factor of the enriched obligor’s 
behavior.172 
A more accurate and systematic approach would be to characterize 
enrichment without cause as a type of juridical fact.173 The distinction 
between juridical acts and juridical facts as sources of obligations is well 
known in civilian theory.174 A juridical fact is a conduct or event to which 
the law attaches legal consequences regardless of whether those 
consequences are in fact desired.175 The conduct of a person can be licit or 
illicit.176 Capacity and fault of the obligor in a licit juridical fact are 
irrelevant factors, whereas culpability and liability are usual factors in the 
case of illicit juridical facts.177 “Quasi-contracts,” including negotiorum 
                                                                                                             
 172. 4 JEAN CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS 471 (9th ed. 1976). 
 173. 3 GABRIEL BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & JULIEN BONNECASE, TRAITE 
THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, SUPPLEMENT No. 113 (1926). 
 174. 1 RENE DEMOGUE, TRAITE DES OBLIGATIONS EN GENERAL No. 11 (1923); 
2 GABRIEL BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & JULIEN BONNECASSE, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET 
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, SUPPLEMENT Nos. 248–613 (1925); 1 JACQUES FLOUR, 
JEAN-LUC AUBERT & ERIC SAVAUX, DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS, L’ACTE 
JURIDIQUE, No. 60 (16th ed. 2014); ZIMMERMANN, supra note 23, at 10–21. A more 
detailed and technical theory of juridical acts prevails in Germany and Greece. See 
LUDWIG ENNECCERUS & HANS CARL NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES 
BÜRGERLICHEN RECHTS § 145 (15th ed. 1960); Jochem Schmitt §§ 104–115 and 
Christian Armbrüster §§ 116–124, in 1 MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM 
BÜRGELICHEN GESETZBUCH (Franz Jürgen Säcker et al. eds., 7th ed. 2015); BALIS, 
supra note 65, §§ 32–34; Marianos Karasis, Eisagogi sta Arthra 127–200 
[Introduction to Articles 127–200], in 1B ASTIKOS KODIX, KAT’ ARTHRO 
ERMINEIA, GENIKES ARCHES [CIVIL CODE COMMENTARY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES] 
1-28 (Apostolos Georgiades & Michael Stathopoulos eds., 2d ed. 2016) (Greece). 
 175. CARBONNIER, supra note 172, at 449. It is noteworthy that the recent 2016 
revision of the French Civil Code includes definitions of juridical acts and facts in two 
new Articles: CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1100-1 (2018) (Fr.) (defining 
actes juridiques as “exercises of will that are intended to produce legal effects”) and 
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1100-2 (2018) (Fr.) (defining faits juridiques 
as “conduct or events to which the law attaches legal consequences”). These articles 
were added in defiance of the stern injunction by Portalis, original drafter of the Code 
Napoléon, against the inclusion of doctrinal material in the code. See YIANNOPOULOS, 
CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 96, at 252; Gruning, supra note 7, at 63–64. The 
German and Greek civil codes, although more verbose and heavily influenced by the 
Pandectists, do not contain definitions of juridical acts and facts.  
 176. CARBONNIER, supra note 172, at 449. 
 177. Aline Tenenbaum et al., Juridical Acts, Juridical Facts, in EUROPEAN 
CONTRACT LAW 72–76 (Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson & Denis Mazeaud eds., 
2008); cf. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1100-2 para. 2 (2018) (Fr.) 
(“Obligations arising from a juridical fact are governed, as the case may be, by 
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gestio, payment of a thing not due, and enrichment without cause, are licit 
juridical facts.178 
This classification seems to accommodate the co-existence of 
objective and subjective factors in an obligation from enrichment without 
cause. Although the obligor is strictly liable merely from the occurrence 
of an unjustified appropriation of wealth, her good or bad faith is taken 
into account when addressing issues of compensation.179 Further, the 
obligee is charged with a duty of good faith, the breach of which may 
impair the causal link between enrichment and impoverishment.180 As a 
juridical fact, enrichment without cause generates a legal obligation of 
restitution.  
3. Enrichment Without Cause as Restitution, Not Restoration  
Enrichment without cause binds the enriched obligor to make 
restitution for the unjustified enrichment she received, which corresponds 
to an impoverishment of the obligee. This observation necessarily means 
that the object of the enrichment has exited the obligee’s patrimony and is 
now part of the obligor’s patrimony.181 If, however, there is no lawful 
cause for retaining this enrichment, the law holds the enriched party 
accountable for returning that same benefit or its traceable product to the 
impoverished obligee.182 
This particular consequence of restitution ought to be distinguished 
from restoration of a thing or benefit already belonging to the “obligee.”183 
When a benefit or a particular thing is merely withheld by another, it is 
                                                                                                             
the sub-chapter relating to extra-contractual liability or the sub-chapter relating to 
other sources of obligations.”).  
 178. Tenenbaum et al., supra note 177, at 73; CARBONNIER, supra note 172, 
at 449, 451; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 97, § 1.6; Arc 
Indust., L.L.C. v. Nungesser, 970 So. 2d 690, 694 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (citing 
Litvinoff’s definition of quasi contracts as “willful and lawful acts [that] give rise 
to obligations without the concurrence of wills, that is, without the agreement of 
the persons involved that is necessary for the formation of a contract”). 
 179. TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 90, Nos. 1069–71. 
 180. See Georges Bonet, La condition d’absence d’intérêt personnel et de faute 
chez l’appauvri pour le succès de l’action de in rem verso, in MELANGES PIERRE 
HEBRAUD 59 (Université Toulouse ed., 1981). 
 181. Nicholas I, supra note 11, at 607–08; ROBY, supra note 19, at 77 (“If 
ownership had not passed, condiction was not applicable.” (citing DIG. 12.1.14)). 
 182. 2 PLANIOL I, supra note 65, No. 938A. 
 183. See WILLIAM W. BUCKLAND, EQUITY IN ROMAN LAW 33–37 (1911, 
reprinted 1983) (discussing restoration in cases of relative nullity on the basis of 
the Roman restitutio in integrum). 
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still owned by the “obligee” in question, who can reclaim it from the 
“obligor” by bringing a real action.184 This is particularly the case with 
nullity of a juridical act185 and dissolution of a contract.186 The purpose of 
restoration is a reversal of the failed act.187 
This general principle finds application particularly in the consequences 
of the action of enrichment without cause,188 but it also complements the 
previous two principles. Under the guidance of these general principles, and 
with reference to comparative civilian jurisprudence and doctrine, focus is 
now placed on the greatest mystery of enrichment without cause—its 
requirements.  
B. Requirements for an Action of Enrichment Without Cause  
The jurisprudence identifies five requirements for enrichment without 
cause: (1) enrichment of the obligor; (2) impoverishment of the obligee; 
                                                                                                             
 184. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 526 (2018). See YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, 
supra note 18, §§ 11:7, 13:7. This distinction is long accepted in civil law and is 
not unknown at common law where the potential misunderstanding of the term 
“restitution” has been noticed. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmts. a, c, e (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
 185. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2033. If a contract of sale is rescinded after the 
thing sold has been delivered to the putative buyer and the price has been paid by 
the putative buyer, ownership of the thing sold reverts back to the putative seller 
while the buyer’s ownership of the funds is reinstated. Id. The same result is 
reached in cases of dissolution of a sale. Id. art. 2018. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & 
GRUNING, supra note 99, §§ 15:9, 15:16. 
 186. When a contract is dissolved, the primary effect is that of restoration—the 
parties are restored to their preexisting patrimonial situations, such restoration being 
made in kind or by value. Art. 2018 para. 1. Nevertheless, if partial performance of 
a value has been rendered to the party seeking performance and that party keeps that 
performance, compensation is due to the other party for this enrichment. Id. para. 2 
& cmt. d. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 99, § 15:3 n.15; 
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS II, supra note 163, § 271.  
 187. Restoration of a payment of a thing not due (condictio indebiti) 
historically served the same purpose. See CARBONNIER, supra note 172, at 463–
64. This concept appears in the pertinent provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code, 
pursuant to which the payee must restore what she has received. See LA. CIV. 
CODE ANN. arts. 2299, 2304; see also YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 18, 
§ 13:13 (explaining that the quasi-contractual action of a payment of a thing not 
due is intended for restoration purposes). 
 188. This Article does not discuss the consequences of the action for 
enrichment without cause. For discussion of the consequences, see generally 
LEVASSEUR, supra note 3, at 429–37; Gordley, supra note 150, at 227–42; 
GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 433–44.  
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(3) causal link between the enrichment and the impoverishment; (4) lack of 
cause for the enrichment; and (5) unavailability of another remedy at law.189 
French legal doctrine has grouped these requirements into material 
requirements—enrichment, impoverishment, and causal link190—and 
juridical requirements—lack of cause and inexistence of other remedy.191 
The following discussion will focus on this categorization.192 
1. Material Requirements 
There are three material requirements for an action of enrichment without 
cause: (1) enrichment of the obligor; (2) impoverishment of the obligee; and 
(3) a causal link between the enrichment and the impoverishment. These 
requirements are discussed with reference to French and Louisiana doctrine 
and jurisprudence and to compatible German and Greek ideas. 
a. Enrichment 
Enrichment of the obligor occurs when “his patrimonial assets 
increase or his liability diminishes.”193 The concept of enrichment is broad, 
encompassing any advantage appreciable in money and taking diverse 
forms.194 It can manifest itself as a positive gain, such as the acquisition of 
                                                                                                             
 189. See supra note 3; see also SMITH, supra note 168, at 418–19. 
 190. See Valerio Forti, Enrichissement injustifié, Conditions juridiques, 
JurisClasseur Civil, Art. 1303 à 1304-4, Fascicule 10, June 2, 2016 (Dec. 10, 2017). 
 191. See Valerio Forti, Enrichissement injustifié, Effets, JurisClasseur Civil, 
Art. 1303 à 1304-4, Fascicule 20, June 2, 2016 (Dec. 10, 2017). 
 192. The usefulness of this classification lies in the burden of proof. Material 
conditions are positive, whereas juridical conditions are negative. Although the 
plaintiff must prove each of the five requirements, the defendant usually will base 
her defense on the lack of a juridical requirement and bears the burden of 
establishing peremptory exceptions against the action. Indust. Cos., Inc. v. 
Durbin, 837 So. 2d 1207, 1213–16 (La. 2003); Fagot v. Parsons, 958 So. 2d 750, 
752–53 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (both discussing the requirements for the success of 
a peremptory exception of no cause of action against an action for enrichment 
without cause). The plaintiff also shoulders the burden of proving the lack of a 
cause for the enrichment because the existence of the cause is presumed. See 
BÉNABENT, supra note 110, No. 485.  
 193. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2298 cmt. b (2018). 
 194. The advantage received by the enriched obligor can be pecuniary or moral 
or both. George Challies provides the example of attending a concert without 
paying for admission as an example of an enrichment that “would be intellectual 
and aesthetic rather than material.” See GEORGE CHALLIES, THE DOCTRINE OF 
UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT IN THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC 71–72 (2d ed. 1952); see 
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property, an expense avoided, or the extinction of an obligation.195 Not all 
enrichments, however, are actionable.196 
Because French doctrine has not provided a satisfactory taxonomy of 
the possible types of enrichment,197 it may be useful to refer here to the 
German classification of enrichment, as simplified by Greek scholars, who 
acknowledge three basic types of enrichment that, in some cases, may 
overlap: (1) performance or other benefit conferred on the obligor at the 
expense of the obligee; (2) obligor’s interference with the obligee’s 
patrimony; and (3) expenses incurred by the obligee on the property of the 
obligor.198 
i. Performance or Benefit Conferred on Obligor at Obligee’s 
Expense 
Performance or other benefit conferred on the obligor at the expense 
of the obligee can be direct or indirect. It is direct when the benefit passes 
from the obligee’s patrimony directly to the obligor’s patrimony.199 It is 
indirect when the patrimony of a third person is involved.200 This category 
of enrichment applies frequently in Germany and Greece because it 
                                                                                                             
also Nicholas I, supra note 11, at 642–43. This example, however, also seems to 
include a pecuniary advantage—not paying for admission. Perhaps attending 
uninvited a private concert to which only certain attendees are invited by private 
and gratuitous invitation would be a more accurate example of an enrichment that 
is moral only. Be that as it may, the weight of authority in France and Quebec 
accept that a “profit moral” can be claimed by means of an actio de in rem verso. 
CHALLIES, supra, at 71–72; 7 PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 167, No. 753; 3 
RENÉ DEMOGUE, TRAITÉ DES OBLIGATIONS No. 150 (1923); JOSSERAND, supra 
note 167, No. 569. 
 195. FLOUR ET AL., FAIT JURIDIQUE, supra note 90, No. 39; MALAURIE ET AL., 
supra note 90, No. 1063 ; Nicholas I, supra note 11, at 641. 
 196. Garber v. Badon & Ranier, 981 So. 2d 92, 101 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (“Not 
every unjust enrichment warrants usage of equity.” (citing Edmonston v. A-
Second Mortg. Co., 289 So. 2d 116, 122 (La. 1974)); see also FLOUR ET AL., FAIT 
JURIDIQUE, supra note 90, No. 33.; TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 90, No. 1062.; 
BÉNABENT, supra note 110, No. 482. 
 197. Forti admits that the French term “enrichissement” is too broad and defies 
systematic categorization. See Forti, supra note 190, Nos. 15, 17. 
 198. MICHAEL STATHOPOULOS, GENIKO ENOCHIKO DIKAIO [GENERAL LAW 
OF OBLIGATIONS] 869 (4th ed. 2004) (Greece) [hereinafter STATHOPOULOS, 
OBLIGATIONS]; 2 PANAGIOTIS ZEPOS, ENOCHIKON DIKAION. EIDIKON MEROS 
[LAW OF OBLIGATIONS. SPECIAL PART] 686, 690–91 (2d ed. 1965) (Greece). 
 199. See Forti, supra note 190, Nos. 38–40; see also infra note 249. 
 200. See Forti, supra note 190, Nos. 38–40; see also infra note 249. 
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typically refers to restoration on the basis of the Roman condictiones and 
not restitution through the actio de in rem verso.201 As noted, in France and 
in Louisiana, recovery of performances from a failed contract is achieved 
by application of the theory of cause202 and the doctrines of nullity or 
dissolution,203 as the case may be.204 This category of enrichment also finds 
application in the restoration of the payment of a thing not due.205  
                                                                                                             
 201. This category typically forms the basis for a condictio causa data causa 
non secuta, that is, a claim for the recovery of performances rendered under a 
failed contract or third-party beneficiary arrangement involving the obligor and 
obligee. See STATHOPOULOS, OBLIGATIONS, supra note 198, at 907.  
 202. There are cases, however, that lie beyond the realm of cause. An example 
would be a failure of cause occurring after the discharge of all conventional 
obligations under the contract. Because the contract is no longer executory, belated 
failure of cause is inoperative. In such a case, restoration is clearly excluded and 
restitution seems to be the only remedy for any inequities. A celebrated example in 
the French jurisprudence is that of an insurer who was entitled to bring the actio de 
in rem verso against the insured in a policy of theft insurance, when the insurer paid 
the coverage and the thing stolen was later recovered by the insured. Cour d’appel 
[CA] [regional court of appeal] Lyon, 1e ch., Mar. 18, 1981, JurisData 40817 (Fr.). 
This situation closely resembles the example of the condictio sine causa in DIG. 
12.7.2 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 32) (concerning the unjustified enrichment of the owner 
of lost clothes who was previously indemnified for the loss by a cleaner under a 
laundry contract, and the clothes were later found).  
 203. There can be cases that lie beyond the scope of breach of contract. An 
example would be the case of underpayment of an insured who was not paid the full 
sum of interest due from the insurer. Payment was ordered on the basis of the actio de 
in rem verso. See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 
1e civ., Dec. 10, 1980, JCP 1981, II, 11678, obs. L. Mourgeon (Fr.). Likewise, a 
company not paying full compensation to an employee of a company is unjustifiably 
enriched at the expense of said employee. See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of 
appeal] Reims, soc., Nov. 9, 1981, JurisData 42488 (Fr.).  
 204. See Forti, supra note 190, No. 31. 
 205. There may be cases, however, that lie within the “gray area” between 
condictio indebiti and actio de in rem verso. This ambiguity is particularly true in cases 
of overpayment for a performance received. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of 
appeal] Paris, 25th ch., Mar. 29, 1985, JurisData 22168 (Fr.) (finding unjustified 
enrichment of a contractor who had received from the owner sums greater than what 
was justified by the progress of the works). The dividing line is also blurred in cases 
of mistaken payment of the debt of another. The payor (solvens) will have an action 
for payment of a thing not due against the payee (accipiens). An action for enrichment 
without cause would be subsidiary to the first action and must be brought against the 
actual debtor who is enriched. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for 
judicial matters] 1e civ., Apr. 4, 2001, D. 2001, 1824, note M. Billiau (Fr.) (ordering 
the actual debtor to make restitution of insurance benefits paid by mistake). Cf. LA. 
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2302 (2018).  
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Nevertheless, there is room for the application of the French/Louisiana 
model of enrichment without cause to this category of enrichments as well. 
The remedy of restitution will apply when the contemplated performance 
is extra-contractual, that is, a thing given or a benefit conferred outside the 
realm of conventional obligations.206 An extra-contractual performance 
can be direct or indirect.207 
Instances of direct, extra-contractual performances typically involve 
services rendered by the obligor directly to the obligee in the absence of a 
contractual relationship. Two famous examples from the French 
jurisprudence can be cited here: (1) the enrichment of the owner of a vehicle 
that was repaired by the proprietor of a garage who believed in good faith that 
a contract for the repairs existed;208 and (2) the enrichment of an heir who used 
information advertised to him by a genealogist to establish his rights to a 
succession of a distant relative without ever hiring the genealogist.209 In 
Louisiana jurisprudence, claims for quantum meruit in the absence of an 
agreement210 also fall under this category.211 
                                                                                                             
 206. See supra notes 181–188 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 
281, 282, 294, 295 and accompanying text. 
 207. Cf. Forti, supra note 190, Nos. 38–40 (discussing the more general concept 
of direct and indirect causal link between enrichment and impoverishment, which 
also applies here); see also infra note 249. 
 208. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 8e ch., Mar. 19, 1976, 
JurisData 242 (Fr.). Here, the fact that the garage proprietor acted in his own interest, 
based on the erroneous belief of the existence of a contract, possibly excludes the 
application of the provisions of negotiorum gestio. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 
2292 cmt. d. Compare with Standard Motor Car Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. 
Co., 97 So. 2d 435 (La. Ct. App. 1957) (characterizing the garage owner as a 
depositary and allowing subrogation claim for the repairs against insurer). 
 209. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Poitiers, Dec. 2, 1907, D. 
1908, 2, 332 (Fr.); see also Nicholas I, supra note 11, at 625. The French Cour de 
cassation, however, later considered that this type of enrichment finds its cause in 
the rules on devolution of the estate. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court 
for judicial matters] 1e civ., May 28, 1991, JurisData 1466, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE 
DE DROIT CIVIL [RTDCIV] 1992, p. 96, obs. J. Mestre (Fr.). 
 210. Reference is made here to the civilian concept of quantum meruit. Baker v. 
Maclay Props. Co., 648 So. 2d 888, 896 (La. 1995) (finding that the civilian concept 
of quantum meruit in the absence of an agreement “is more correctly referred to as 
unjust enrichment, also known as actio de in rem verso”). Upon codification of the 
actio de in rem verso, cases of quasi-contractual quantum meruit are now governed 
by Article 2298 of the Louisiana Civil Code. See Jackson v. Capitol City Family 
Health Ctr., 928 So. 2d 129, 132–33 (La. Ct. App. 2005). This terminology is 
discussed infra note 303. 
 211. Quantum meruit can be contractual or quasi-contractual. Compare 
Ricky’s Diesel Serv., Inc. v. Pinell, 906 So. 2d 536, 539 (La. Ct. App. 2005) 
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Other examples of direct, extra-contractual performances concern 
cases of voluntary work performed in the absence of any domestic or 
cohabiting relationship.212 Yet other cases involve voluntary services 
between spouses and family members, and courts confront the difficult 
question of enrichment from gratuitous dispositions.213 In a number of 
decisions, courts have sustained a claim of compensation made by a 
spouse in a regime of separate property for payment of the spouse’s 
separate debts or for assistance provided in the other spouse’s business or 
profession.214 Compensation, however, was denied for services provided 
by a spouse when the spouses were under a regime of acquets and gains,215 
                                                                                                             
(applying quasi-contractual quantum meruit for repairs to a diesel engine without 
a valid services contract), with Morphy, Makofsky & Masson, Inc. v. Canal Place 
2000, 538 So. 2d 569, 573 (La. 1989) (using contractual quantum meruit to 
calculate remuneration of subcontractor when the existing agreement did not 
address the issue and characterizing quantum meruit as a device for measurement 
of damages rather than a method of recovery per se). See infra notes 294, 303. 
 212. See, e.g., Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 15e ch., Mar. 
10, 1978, JurisData 187 (Fr.) (involving unjustified enrichment of the heirs of a farm 
owner for improvements made to the farm by plaintiff voluntary worker); Cour de 
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Mar. 6, 1979, Gaz. Pal. 
1979, 2, 237 (Fr.) (awarding compensation to voluntary employee of a company). 
 213. For an in depth discussion of this issue, see Nicolas Le Rudulier, La modernité 
de l’enrichissement sans cause en droit de la famille, in MELANGES RAYMOND LE 
GUIDEC 147 (V. Zalewski-Sicard et al. eds., 2014); Marlène Burgard, L’enrichissement 
sans cause au sein du couple: quelles différences de régime entre époux, partenaires et 
concubins?, LES PETITES AFFICHES [LPA], May 2010, No. 101, p. 35. 
 214. See, e.g., Lee v. Lee, 868 So. 2d 316, 319 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (awarding 
compensation on the theory of unjustified enrichment to husband for payments he 
made on wife’s separate debts with his separate funds). The same solution is 
obtained when the claim is made following divorce proceedings. See Tribunal de 
grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Apr. 6, 1968, 
D. 1968 Somm. 101 (Fr.); see also Françoise Conneau, Inadéquation de 
l’application de la théorie de l’enrichissement sans cause à l’indemnisation de 
l’épouse séparée de biens, in MELANGES JEAN-PIERRE BEGUET 111 (Université de 
Toulon ed., 1985); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e 
civ., Dec. 16, 1997, JurisData 5376, DROIT & PATRIMOINE 1998, No. 1923, obs. 
Chauvel (Fr.) (involving a mother who provided assistance to the operation of a 
business belonging to her son and daughter-in-law).  
 215. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., May 
10, 1984, JurisData 871, DEFRÉNOIS 1985, art. 33560, p. 865, note G. Champenois 
(Fr.). For discussion of the Louisiana law on this issue, see Kimberly D. 
Higginbotham, Reimbursement for Satisfaction of Community Obligations with 
Separate Property: Getting What’s Yours, 68 LA. L. REV. 181, 213 (2007) 
(“[I]nstead of using the doctrine of enrichment without cause between spouses, 
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as well as when the assistance provided did not exceed that imposed by 
the spousal obligation of assistance.216 The jurisprudence has also admitted 
claims of unjustified enrichment for assistance provided or expenses 
incurred within concubinage,217 so long as a valid justification for 
retention of the enrichment cannot be ascertained.218 
                                                                                                             
courts employ article 2365 [of the Louisiana Civil Code], which provides the 
alternative remedy of reimbursement for situations involving satisfaction of 
community obligations with separate property.”); see also ANDREA CARROLL & 
RICHARD MORENO, MATRIMONIAL REGIMES § 8:9, in 16 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE (4th ed. 2016). 
 216. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Jan. 9, 
1979, Bull. civ. I, No. 11, DEFRÉNOIS 1980, art. 32174, p. 44, note Posnard and art. 
32348, p. 915, obs. J.-L. Aubert (Fr.). Cf. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 98 (2018). It should 
be remembered, however, that the general claim for unjustified enrichment among 
spouses must yield before any other provisions of family law that will supply the rule 
of decision as lex specialis. For instance, claims for contributions to education and 
training are governed by a special provision. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 121.  
 217. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Jan. 14, 1987, D. 1987, 
inf. rap. 36 (Fr.) (involving unjust enrichment of companion from loan repayments, 
payment of notarial deeds, and building materials, relating to personal property and 
made by concubine); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e 
civ., Oct. 15, 1996, D. 1997, 177, note R. Libchaber, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT 
CIVIL [RTDCIV] 1997, p. 636, obs. J. Hauser, and p. 657, obs. J. Mestre (Fr.) 
(concubine providing assistance to her partner’s business and profession).  
 218. See Succession of Pereuilhet, 23 La. Ann. 294, 295–96 (1871) (awarding 
compensation to a concubine for her nursing services in the absence of proof that 
concubinage was the motive for the parties’ cohabitation and that the services 
rendered were incidental to such cohabitation). But see Moncrief v. Succession of 
Armstrong, 939 So. 2d 714, 722 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (dismissing concubine’s 
quantum meruit claim against decedent’s estate for services provided to 
decedent). The Greek courts have gone a step further. The Greek Supreme Court 
awarded compensation to a concubine for her substantial gifts to her late partner, 
under the theory that the considerable value of these gifts signified an implied 
promise to marry that was never fulfilled because of her partner’s death. See 
Areios Pagos [AP] [Supreme Court] 1751/2014, Athens Bar Association Database 
(Dec. 10, 2017), http://www.dsanet.gr (Greece) [https://perma.cc/QY2D-H4J2]. 
The court’s reasoning here is highly questionable. Although it is true that parties 
can add a condition on their contract which shall furnish the causa, such a 
condition—and any accompanying enrichment—cannot be unilaterally imposed 
on the other party. See KASER, supra note 130, § 139.3, at 597. Cf. Succession of 
Joublanc, 5 So. 2d 762, 764 (La. 1941) (“One who renders valuable services to 
another on his promise that in his will he will compensate to the extent of the 
value of the services the party rendering them is entitled to collect their value from 
the succession of the party for whom the services were rendered if he dies without 
having fulfilled his promise.”); Broussard v. Compton, 36 So. 3d 376, 377 (La. 
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Direct extra-contractual performance can also occur in cases of a null 
contract in which restoration based on the nullity of the contract is 
insufficient or impracticable.219 Two illustrative examples from the French 
jurisprudence involve the unjustified enrichment of the seller for 
improvements made to the property by the purchaser following a purchase 
agreement220 that was later annulled221 and the unjustified enrichment of a 
retailer for work performed on his premises under a brewery contract that 
subsequently was annulled.222 
An extra-contractual performance can be indirect. Here, a third person 
receives an advantage from an unpaid performance rendered on an original 
contract. Usual examples from the jurisprudence involve a lessor 
benefiting from improvements made to her property by a contractor hired 
by the lessee who later defaulted on her obligations.223 The enrichment of 
the owner of property at the expense of an unpaid subcontractor following 
                                                                                                             
Ct. App. 2010) (plaintiffs made improvements on defendant’s land relying on 
defendant’s oral promise to donate property to plaintiffs). LA. CIV. CODE ANN. 
art. 1967; David V. Snyder, Comparative Law in Action: Promissory Estoppel, 
The Civil Law, and The Mixed Jurisdiction, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 695, 
720 (discussing the revision of Louisiana Civil Code article 1967 and the 
introduction of detrimental reliance in the Louisiana civil law).  
 219. In Louisiana, it is questionable whether such a situation would be adequately 
addressed by the “award of damages” contemplated in the first paragraph of Article 
2033 of the Louisiana Civil Code. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2033 para. 1 (“If it is 
impossible or impracticable to make restoration in kind, it may be made through an 
award of damages.”). An award of damages also is contemplated when the cause of 
nullity is fraud or duress. Id. arts. 1958, 1964. When the cause of nullity is error, the 
reliance interest of the innocent party may be protected either through an award of 
damages or by upholding the contract. Id. art. 1952. See Saúl Litvinoff, Vices of 
Consent, Error, Fraud, Duress, and an Epilogue on Lesion, 50 LA. L. REV. 1, 39–45, 
76–79, 101–03 (1989). 
 220. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2623. 
 221. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Reims, Nov. 2, 1981, 
JurisData 42546 (Fr.) (involving unjustified enrichment of the seller of an 
immovable for improvements made by the buyer in a purchase agreement that 
was subsequently annulled due to the seller’s fraud). 
 222. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Dec. 23, 1980, 
JurisData 1094 (Fr.). 
 223. The seminal Boudier case from France is an example. See supra note 3. 
Several other examples from the French jurisprudence concern the enrichment of 
an issuer of a check that was drawn on the wrong account. Cf. Cour d’appel [CA] 
[regional court of appeal] Paris, 15e ch., May 6, 1983, JurisData 23439 (Fr.).  
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default of the main contractor is another example.224 An action based on 
indirect enrichment, however, often will stumble upon the usual existence 
of a lawful cause that will excuse retention of the enrichment in the hands 
of the third party, as discussed infra.225  
The “performance” contemplated in this category is not limited only 
to conventional obligations. Performance of a legal obligation having a 
cause that has failed can also give rise to an action of enrichment without 
cause.226 Again, enrichment here can be direct or indirect. The landmark 
decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Minyard227 furnishes an 
example of indirect enrichment. The holding in this case seems to stand 
for the proposition that an actio de in rem verso will lie in a contractual or 
delictual “action in indemnity” against a third party whose fault triggered 
the payment of damages in the absence of another remedy at law.228  
ii. Obligor’s Interference with Obligee’s Patrimony 
The second category of enrichments entails an obligor’s interference 
with the obligee’s patrimony through unauthorized use of the latter’s 
property or services. When such interference satisfies the requirements for 
                                                                                                             
 224. See, e.g., Vandervoort v. Levy, 396 So. 2d 480 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (involving 
unjustified enrichment of owner of immovable property from additional work 
performed by contractor who was instructed by architect to perform additional work). 
 225. The existence of a lawful cause, usually found in the legal relationship 
between third-party enrichee and original obligor, also explains the complex 
situations of third-party enrichments stemming from payment of a thing not due. 
Thus, the situation in which obligor A is instructed by obligee B to pay C who is 
B’s obligee presents many variations, all dependent on the validity of the obligation 
between B and C. For a detailed discussion, see Nicholas I, supra note 11, at 609–
10. Existence of a lawful cause for retention of the enrichment also explains the non-
availability of a claim for unjustified enrichment against a third person who in good 
faith and for value obtained the object of the enrichment from the obligor. Cf. LA. 
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2305 cmt. d. For a detailed discussion of third party 
enrichments, see Nicholas I, supra note 11, at 626–33.  
 226. See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 
1e civ., Feb. 1, 1984, JurisData 89 (Fr.) (awarding compensation to first husband 
who successfully disavowed paternity against the second husband of the mother 
for past child support payments). But see Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of 
appeal] Douai, Nov. 8, 1978, JurisData 2296 (Fr.) (refusing to extend such 
compensation to past child support payments). 
 227. Minyard v. Curtis Prods., Inc., 205 So. 2d 422 (1967). 
 228. See Litvinoff, Appellate Courts, supra note 113, at 203–05. 
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delictual liability, the action against the obligor will sound in tort.229 Here, 
a non-delictual interference is contemplated,230 usually because the 
requirements for delictual liability have not been met.231 Thus, the 
unauthorized use of one’s image232 may be actionable as enrichment 
without cause. Enrichment without cause can also result from the 
exploitation of the intellectual property of others, such as the publication 
of an operetta without authorization from the composer’s heirs,233 or the 
                                                                                                             
 229. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315. Similarly, when the interference is 
beneficial to the owner and satisfies the requirements of negotiorum gestio, this 
quasi-contractual remedy ought to apply as lex specialis. See, e.g., Cour de 
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] civ., Jan. 15, 1866, D.P. 66, 
1, 75, S. 66, 1, 52 (Fr.) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim for restitution of expenses 
incurred when plaintiff put out a fire on defendant’s property). See DEMOGUE, 
supra note 194, No. 149; 7 PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 167, No. 753; RIPERT 
& BOULANGER, supra note 167, No. 1277; JOSSERAND, supra note 167, No. 569; 
BEUDANT & LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIÈRE, supra note 60, No. 1751; MARTY & 
RAYNAUD, supra note 81, No. 350 n.7 and No. 382.  
 230. See Nicholas III, supra note 113, at 14. 
 231. German and Greek scholars usually refer to the example of a stowaway using 
a means of transportation without paying a fare. According to their analysis, recovery 
in delict or quasi-delict is unsatisfactory because the only “damage” caused would be 
the unauthorized use or enjoyment of any complimentary onboard services and the 
additional fuel consumed, if it can be calculated, but not the value of the fare, since 
the stowaway occupied an empty seat. See STATHOPOULOS, OBLIGATIONS, supra note 
198, at 881. Especially in the German “air-travel case,” delictual liability may be 
excluded when the alleged tortfeasor is not culpable because of age or mental capacity. 
See supra note 141 and accompanying text. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2318–19. 
Louisiana tort law seems more amenable to full recovery in such cases, based on the 
Louisiana law concept of the tort of conversion. See FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS 
C. GALLIGAN, LOUISIANA TORT LAW § 2-6(i) (1996, Supp. 2003); WILLIAM 
CRAWFORD, TORT LAW § 12:13, in 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 2009); 
see also Dual Drilling Co. v. Mills Equip. Inv., 721 So. 2d 853 (La. 1998) (enunciating 
“principles of civilian conversion,” which can be exercised through one of the 
following actions: (a) by means of a revendicatory action under LA. CIV. CODE art. 
526; (b) by an action for restitution based on payment of a thing not due under LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 2299; or (c) by a delictual action for damages under LA. CIV. CODE art. 
2315). It is only when the requirements for these actions are not met that an actio de 
in rem verso may become available. Based on the above, if the boy in the “air-travel 
case,” discussed supra notes 141–151, had mistakenly boarded the wrong airplane and 
this mistake was not actionable under Louisiana Civil Code article 2316, then an 
action for enrichment without cause likely would be available.   
 232. See Patrick N. Broyles, Intercontinental Identity: The Right to the Identity 
in the Louisiana Civil Code, 65 LA. L. REV. 823 (2005). 
 233. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] civ., July 
6, 1927, S. 1928, 1, 19 (Fr.). 
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unauthorized use of an invention, even if it was not patented by the inventor 
or his successors.234  
The unauthorized enjoyment or temporary use of an asset or a right235 
belonging to another may also constitute enrichment. Thus, the original 
purchaser of equipment who continued using the equipment upon 
dissolution of the sale was held liable to compensate the original seller for 
this unjustified enrichment.236 Unauthorized use may occur when a legal 
cause for using the property of another has lapsed by operation of law.237  
iii. Obligee’s Expenses on Obligor’s Property 
The third category of cases includes expenses avoided on the part of 
the obligor or improvements to the obligor’s property as a result of work 
performed by the obligee. This category is residual in character and it 
usually comprises cases in which the liability of the enriched party 
                                                                                                             
 234. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Nov. 8, 1963, ANNALES DE 
LA PROPRIÉTÉ INDUSTRIELLE [ANN. PROP. IND.] 1964, art. 1245, note Mathély (Fr.). 
 235. See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 23e ch., Jan. 21, 
1983, JurisData 20908 (Fr.) (concerning the lease of a billboard without the consent 
of the real owner). The same result obtains in the example of a creditor seizing 
property not belonging to his debtor or his debtor’s surety. Cour d’appel [CA] 
[regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch, Feb. 28, 1983, JurisData 21462 (Fr.).  
 236. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., Dec. 14, 
1965, Bull. civ. III, No. 645 (Fr.). Because the continued use of the contractual object 
occurred after the dissolution, this situation is best addressed by the provisions on 
enrichment without cause. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2298. On the other hand, if the 
use occurred before the dissolution, an award of damages according to the more 
specific rules on dissolution is the appropriate remedy. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 
2018. Absent such a specific provision in the French Civil Code, the French courts 
resort to the actio de in rem verso in such cases. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of 
appeal] Paris, June 15, 1983, JurisData 24607 (Fr.) (involving the use of property by 
purchaser prior to dissolution of purchase agreement). On the contrary, circumstances 
may reveal that the plaintiff did not intend to make any profit from the transaction at 
issue. In such a case, the gratuitous nature of the disposition furnishes justification for 
the enrichment. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 
comm., Mar. 4, 1974, JURISCLASSEUR CIVIL ARTICLES 1370 À 1381, fascicule 8/1988, 
No. 153 (1988) (Fr.) (concerning a machine which had been lent by the plaintiff on 
the basis of what seemed to have been a situation resembling a gratuitous loan for 
use). Cf. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2891. 
 237. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., 
Dec. 15, 1976, Bull. civ. I, No. 409 (Fr.) (divorced spouse was ordered to pay rent 
to her former spouse for use of his apartment that she had occupied with her two 
children from the date of final judgment of divorce). 
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diminishes.238 The usefulness of this category is twofold. First, this category 
highlights situations involving an enrichment that cannot be easily 
characterized as a “performance” or “interference.” Examples include 
extinguishing an obligation of the obligor to a third party, either by paying 
off an obligor’s debt to a third party239 or performing an obligation 
incumbent upon the obligor,240 or receiving an enrichment without 
payment.241 Second, because this subcategory focuses on the obligee’s acts, 
a closer examination of the obligee’s duty of good faith is warranted.242 
Especially in cases of improvements to land by adverse possessors, the rules 
on accession will apply nevertheless as lex specialis.243  
                                                                                                             
 238. This category will usually overlap with the preceding two categories. 
Indeed, a situation involving improvements made to leased property by an unpaid 
contractor hired by the lessee potentially fits under both categories. It could be 
used as an example of an indirect extra-contractual performance rendered by the 
contractor. It can also serve as an illustration of an expense avoided on the part of 
the lessor who decides to keep the improvement. See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional 
court of appeal] Paris, 23e chapter, Dec. 12, 1978, JurisData 592 (Fr.) 
(considering both options and choosing to characterize the enrichment as a cost 
avoided by the lessor). Further, unauthorized use of an asset belonging to another 
may also be seen as avoiding the expense of paying for the asset. 
 239. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] civ., 
June 4, 1924, D. 1926, 1, 102 (Fr.). Such cases, however, may overlap with 
situations involving payment of a thing not due. See supra note 205. 
 240. See Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original 
jurisdiction] Lille, July 2, 1957, JURISCLASSEUR CIVIL ARTICLES 1370 À 1381, 
fascicule 8/1988, No. 84 (1988) (Fr.) (demanding the child’s estranged father 
compensate the non-custodian grandfather, who cared for the child of his 
deceased daughter, to the extent exceeding the grandfather’s natural obligation to 
care for the child). See infra note 305. 
 241. See, e.g., Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris 15e ch., Oct. 
8, 1981, JurisData 27696 (Fr.) (involving unjustified enrichment of a company 
receiving services that were paid in error by another company). 
 242. As discussed infra notes 255–263 and accompanying text, the obligee 
will not be able to claim compensation when she acted in her own interest and at 
her own risk and peril. See FLOUR ET AL., FAIT JURIDIQUE, supra note 90, No. 50–
51; STATHOPOULOS, OBLIGATIONS, supra note 198, at 875–76. 
 243. See YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 11.22; Symeon 
Symeonides, Developments in the Law: 1983-84, Property, 45 LA. L. REV. 541, 542–
43 (1984) (noting that the gaps in the pre-1984 law of accession “could be filled only 
by analogical interpretation of [several Civil Code] articles . . . resorting to the general 
principle of unjust enrichment.”). See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for 
judicial matters] 3e civ., Jan. 26, 1972, Bull civ. III, No. 65 (Fr.) (applying the rules 
on accession for improvements to land by a construction company that was later 
declared insolvent). For a detailed discussion of the concept of good faith with relation 
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b. Impoverishment 
Impoverishment of the obligee occurs when “his patrimonial assets 
diminish or his liabilities increase.”244 In this sense, impoverishment is the 
negative aspect of enrichment. Cases of impoverishment without a cause, 
therefore, should not differ from cases of enrichment without cause.245 The 
plaintiff must establish that the transfer of value was made at the expense 
of her patrimony, and this claim must be appreciable in money.246 
c. Causal Link Between Enrichment and Impoverishment 
According to the prevailing opinion in civilian doctrine, the term causal 
link is described as a correlation between enrichment and impoverishment, 
which must be the incontestable result of the same event.247 In most cases,248 
                                                                                                             
to adverse possessors, see John A. Lovett, Good Faith in Louisiana Property Law, 78 
LA. L. REV. 1163 (2018).  
 244. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2298 cmt. b (2018); Nicholas I, supra note 11, 
at 643–44. 
 245. See RIPERT & BOULANGER, supra note 167, No. 1278 (“What shocks 
equity is not that a person is enriched, which is indeed permissible; it is that it be 
at the expense of others.”). 
 246. In essence, the plaintiff also must establish that she received no counter-
performance or compensation for her impoverishment. See Cour de cassation 
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ, May 6, 2009, JurisData 48116 
(Fr.) (holding that the “impoverishment” of a companion who built a house on his 
concubine’s land is not established if it was offset by his occupation of the house 
without charge for a number of years); see also RÉMY CABRILLAC, DROIT DES 
OBLIGATIONS No. 206 (11th ed. 2014) (discussing this issue as a lack of 
justification of the obligor’s enrichment). 
 247. See Georges Bonet, Enrichissement sans cause, in JURISCLASSEUR CIVIL 
ARTICLES 1370 A 1381, fascicule 8/1988, No. 115 (1988); FLOUR ET AL., FAIT 
JURIDIQUE, supra note 90, No. 41; BENABENT, supra note 110, No. 489; PHILIPPE 
MALINVAUD ET AL., DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS No. 812 (13th ed. 2014); BERTRAND 
FAGES, DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS No. 452 (5th ed. 2015). 
 248. There have been cases in which such correlation was absent 
automatically, that is, without any act or fault of the parties. For example, an 
original plaintiff in civil proceedings and her attorney could not claim unjustified 
enrichment of subsequent plaintiffs who relied on that attorney’s work on the case, 
absent any indication of additional work performed. St. Pierre v. Northrop 
Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc., 102 So. 3d 1003, 1014–15 (La. Ct. App. 2012); 
Lyons v. City of Shreveport, 339 So. 2d 466, 499 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Kirkpatrick 
v. Young, 456 So. 2d 622, 624 (La. 1984); see also Baron v. Baron, 286 So. 2d 
480 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that an attorney appointed by certain heirs to 
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establishing such a correlation will be a relatively straightforward 
exercise.249  
On the other hand, an established causal link between enrichment and 
impoverishment can be severed by acts of the obligee. It is a rigorous 
principle of the law of obligations that the obligee to a claim for damages 
is held to a duty of good faith.250 Thus, in cases of contractual or delictual 
liability, the doctrine of comparative fault,251 or the obligee’s failure to 
abide by reasonable mitigating duties,252 will reduce the amount of 
damages sought from the breaching obligor. This reduction occurs because 
the obligee’s acts or omissions severed or impaired the causal link between 
the obligor’s liability and the direct damage sustained by the obligee. The 
same principle ought to apply to cases of liability for enrichment without 
cause. Although the obligor is strictly liable for her enrichment that 
correlates with the obligee’s impoverishment, the obligee’s breach of the 
duty of good faith may impair this causal link.253 
                                                                                                             
recover assets of the succession to the benefit of all the heirs was entitled to seek 
payment only from the persons who employed him).  
 249. The correlation can be direct or indirect, that is, through the patrimony of 
a third person. Also, it does not matter that impoverishment has not been the only 
condition for enrichment, as long as there is a correlation between the two. See 7 
PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 167, No. 755 n.2 (noting the lack of such a link in 
the example of a contractor who may not claim unjustified enrichment when his 
impoverishment resulted mainly from his own mismanagement or misfortune). 
 250. See LITVINOFF, DAMAGES, supra note 30, §§ 5.32–5.33, 10.6.  
 251. Id.; see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2003, 2323 (2018).  
 252. See LITVINOFF, DAMAGES, supra note 30, §§ 5.32–5.33, 10.6; see also 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2002.  
 253. Examining the obligee’s duty of good faith in the context of the causal 
link between enrichment and impoverishment is preferred by this author as a 
simpler and more straightforward approach. French doctrine, on the other hand, 
discusses the obligee’s duty of good faith when examining the juridical 
requirement of lack of cause or justification for the enrichment. According to this 
view, the obligee’s failure to abide by her duty of good faith serves as a cause for 
the justification of the obligor’s enrichment. To justify this approach, several 
authorities identify two elements in the juridical requirements of unjustified 
enrichment, namely, a “technical” and a “moral” element. The technical element 
refers to the traditional requirements of lack of cause and subsidiarity of the 
remedy for unjustified enrichment. The moral element focuses on the behavior of 
both the obligor and obligee and sanctions their bad faith. See TERRÉ ET AL., supra 
note 90, Nos. 1068–71; P. Rémy, Des autres sources d’obligations, in POUR UNE 
REFORME DU REGIME GENERAL DES OBLIGATIONS 44, 45 (F. Terré ed., 2013). The 
addition of this moral element prevailed in the revision of the French Civil Code 
and has been criticized for abruptly departing from the past understanding of 
cause. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1303-2 (2018) (Fr.) (reducing 
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The obligee clearly breaches her duty of good faith254 when the 
impoverishing act was performed by the obligee in pursuit of her own 
personal interest and at her own risk or by her own wrongful act.255 Such 
is the case when a contractor agrees to rebuild a school while fully aware 
of the risks associated with the collection of his fee and the legality of the 
contract.256 Similarly, a business consultant cannot claim compensation for 
his impoverishment that was a result of a failed business deal. 257  
Voluntary improvements made to the property of another with 
knowledge of a lack of any juridical cause will negate any action for 
unjustified enrichment.258 The French jurisprudence refers to several other 
examples of improvements made by bad faith possessors,259 although, in 
                                                                                                             
the recovery of an obligee who pursues a personal interest or who is in bad faith) 
and CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1303-4 (2018) (Fr.) (increasing the 
amount of compensation owed by a bad faith obligor).  
 254. With reference to the juridical requirement of lack of cause, French writers 
distinguish cause of the enrichment from cause of the impoverishment and discuss 
the fault of the obligee in relation to cause of the impoverishment. See STARCK, 
supra note 30, Nos. 1818–19. For a discussion of this requirement with reference to 
the Louisiana jurisprudence, see LEVASSEUR, supra note 3, at 399–403.  
 255. Charrier v. Bell, 496 So. 2d 601, 603 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming trial 
court’s finding “that any impoverishment claimed by plaintiff was a result of his 
attempts ‘for his own gain’ and that his presence and actions on the property of a 
third party placed him in a ‘precarious position, if not in legal bad faith.’”); 
BEUDANT & LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIÈRE, supra note 60, No. 1752; Bonet, supra 
note 180, at 59–64. 
 256. Bamburg Steel Buildings, Inc. v. Lawrence Gen. Corp., 817 So. 2d 427, 
438 (La. Ct. App. 2002). French jurisprudence steadily dismisses claims of 
unjustified enrichment brought by contractors who were compelled to perform 
additional work when the need for this work is attributed to the contractor’s own 
fault. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ., 
Jan. 13, 1982, JurisData 112 (Fr.). 
 257. Zeising v. Shelton, 648 Fed. App’x 434, 441 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 258. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., Mar. 
18, 1954, JCP 1954 II 8168, note P. Ourliac and M. de Juglart. (Fr.) (denying 
unjustified enrichment claim of evicted farmer who continued cultivating land 
knowing that he was no longer a lawful possessor). 
 259. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ., 
June 7, 1974, Bull. civ. III, No. 240 (Fr.) (dismissing unjustified enrichment claim 
of an adverse possessor who had built a hotel on the property of the owner); see 
also the following French Cours d’appel [CA] [regional courts of appeal] 
decisions: CA Pau, Apr. 19, 1983, JurisData 42112 (dismissing unjustified 
enrichment claim for improvements made by a companion to his concubine’s 
dwelling in which he had stayed rent free for a considerable period of time); CA 
Reims, Oct. 17, 1983, JurisData 44092 (dismissing an enrichment claim for 
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Louisiana, such situations are governed by rules of property law as lex 
specialis.260 
An obligee acts in her own interest particularly when she imposes the 
enrichment on the other party who normally would not incur such an 
expense. Thus, the owner of a mill who incurred expenses for widening a 
river cannot claim the unjustified enrichment of the owners of the mills 
downstream who were also benefitted by this action.261  
Lastly, when the enrichment consists of expenses avoided by the obligor 
because of acts of the obligee, the obligee’s actions should be carefully 
scrutinized to determine whether the obligee abided by her duty of good 
faith.262 Thus, a homeowner who moved her home onto the property of 
                                                                                                             
improvements to land made by a prospective purchaser when the final sale was 
not concluded because of that purchaser’s fault); CA Pau, Apr. 30, 1986, 
JurisData 41332 (dismissing an enrichment claim for improvements to a building 
made by an occupant who had no semblance of title).  
 260. See YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 11.22; Symeonides, 
supra note 243, at 542–43; Lovett, supra note 243. The rules on accession, however, 
do not always exclude the admissibility of equitable remedies. See, e.g., Brankline 
v. Capuano, 656 So. 2d 1, 6 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that the previous owner of 
a building who lost ownership under Louisiana Civil Code article 493 could bring 
an action for damages under a theory of quantum meruit); Broussard v. Compton, 
36 So. 3d 376 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (affirming trial court judgment ordering owner 
to compensate adverse possessor for improvements made under a theory of 
unjustified enrichment). A cause of action for improvements may also be 
established in contract if an accession clause is found in a contract between the 
parties. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2695 (2018); Davis v. Elmer, 166 So. 3d 1082, 
1088 (La. Ct. App. 2015). But see infra note 287 and accompanying text.  
 261. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] req., June 22, 
1927, S. 1927, 1, 338; see also Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial 
matters] 1e civ., Oct. 19, 1976, Bull. civ. I, No. 300 (Fr.) (dismissing unjustified 
enrichment claim of landowner who extended the power grid to his own land by 
facilitating the connection of his neighbor); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court 
for judicial matters] 3e civ., May 20, 2009, JurisData 48239 (Fr.) (dismissing 
unjustified enrichment claim of association of riparian landowners that performed 
work to maintain the navigability of two rivers thereby benefitting neighboring 
landowners). 
 262. See supra note 242 and infra note 342. Cf. Fox v. Sloo, 10 La. Ann. 11 (La. 
1855) (“The equitable doctrine, that one at whose expense another is benefited must be 
indemnified, cannot be extended to a person who intrudes his services on another against 
his will and the policy of a statute.”). Accord Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court 
for judicial matters] 1e civ., May 6, 1953, D. 1953, 609, note Goré (Fr.). 
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another and, upon being evicted, abandoned it, has no action for 
enrichment without cause.263  
2. Juridical Requirements  
French and Louisiana jurisprudence developed the juridical 
requirements to restrict the number of cases in which the remedy of the actio 
de in rem verso would be available. Traditional doctrine identifies two such 
requirements—lack of cause and unavailability of another remedy at law.  
a. Lack of Cause for Retaining Enrichment  
The existence of a lawful cause for enrichment excludes any claim for 
restitution.264 The term “cause” in this context should be understood in its 
broader sense, encompassing any legal justification265 for the retention of 
the enrichment in the hands of the enrichee.266 The Louisiana Civil Code 
explains that “[t]he term ‘without cause’ is used in this context to exclude 
                                                                                                             
 263. Rougeou v. Rougeou, 971 So. 2d 466 (La. Ct. App. 2007). In the same vein, 
see MJH Operations, Inc. v. Manning, 63 So. 3d 296 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (dismissing 
repair shop’s unjustified enrichment claim against vehicle owner for unpaid repairs 
because plaintiff made no genuine effort to collect payment and failed to enforce any 
other statutory remedy, such as the repairman’s privilege on automobiles); Meyers v. 
Denton, 848 So. 2d 759 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (dismissing landowners’ reimbursement 
claim for improvements made to road because they knew or should have known that 
the road was public); MKM, L.L.C. v. Revstock Marine Transp., Inc., 773 So. 2d 776 
(La. Ct. App. 2000) (dismissing reimbursement claim brought by sellers of vessel who 
refurbished vessel after parties had signed purchase option agreement).  
 264. See Roubier, supra note 60, at 47. 
 265. The revised French Civil Code refers to “unjustified enrichment,” 
enrichissement injustifié—thus preferring the term “justification” to “cause.” This 
change is semantic and does not change the law. See Forti, supra note 92, No. 2.  
 266. Cf. Edmonston v. A-Second Mortg. Co. of Slidell, 289 So. 2d 116, 122 (La. 
1974) (“‘Cause’ is not in this instance assigned the meaning commonly associated 
with contracts.”). Traditional French doctrine interpreted “cause” in this context to 
mean the regular mode of acquisition of a right. See RIPERT & BOULANGER, supra 
note 167, No. 1280. In this sense, cause is tantamount to the Roman iusta causa, that 
is, the broad notion of cause which is defined as the reason why a person holds a right 
(any right) in the civil law. See MARTY & RAYNAUD, supra note 81, No. 353. The 
existence of a legal cause is presumed. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the 
absence of a justification for retention of the enrichment. See JOSSERAND, supra note 
167, No. 573; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] req., Nov. 
21, 1917, S. 1920, 1, 293 (Fr.).  
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cases in which the enrichment results from a valid juridical act or the 
law.”267 The following discussion is based on this classification.  
i. Valid Juridical Act  
A valid juridical act is a volitional justification for the retention of the 
enrichment.268 Emphasis here is placed on the will of the impoverished 
party who voluntarily places the enrichment in the hands of the enriched 
party. Here, cause of the enrichment coincides with the cause of 
conventional obligation.269 Also, the will of the impoverished party gives 
effect to the alienation of her property and excludes belated complaints 
under the guise of enrichment without cause by application of the civilian 
maxim non venire contra factum proprium.270 
The juridical act can be unilateral, such as a testament, or bilateral, 
such as a contract.271 Contracts are the most significant causes for the 
retention of the enrichment,272 especially when the contract is between the 
                                                                                                             
 267. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2298 (2018). See Gruning, supra note 7, at 65–
66 (arguing that the definition of “cause” in Louisiana Civil Code article 2298 is 
didactic but still useful to avoid any misunderstandings in practice).  
 268. FLOUR ET AL., FAIT JURIDIQUE, supra note 90, No. 44; TERRÉ ET AL., 
supra note 90, No. 1068. 
 269. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1966–70. 
 270. “[N]o one is allowed to go against (the consequences) of one’s own act.” 
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 17, § 88 n.32. See Cour de cassation 
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] civ., May 17, 1944, S. 1944, 1, 132 
(Fr.) (holding that the actio de in rem verso cannot enable a contracting party to 
bring forward belated complaints of a bad bargain and noting that “it is not up to 
the judge to modify a contract concluded between the parties, nor to deprive of 
the seller the profit that has its legal cause in a lawful contract, entered into freely 
by the parties.”); see also JCD Mktg. Co. v. Bass Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 812 So. 
2d 834 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the enrichment accruing to hotel from 
renting rooms above standard rates allegedly promised to tour operator was not 
unjust because hotel would be justified in seeking such rates). Therefore, the 
impoverished party cannot invoke enrichment without cause in the presence of a 
contract, even if it is lesionary for one of the parties. See RIPERT & BOULANGER, 
supra note 167, No. 1280 (“The unfairness of enrichment exists only if the 
defendant had no right to retain it, and there can be no question here of an abuse 
of the right because it is a perfectly defined right.”).  
 271. BÉNABENT, supra note 110, No. 491. 
 272. Drs. Bethea, Moustoukas & Weaver, L.L.C. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 
376 F.3d 399, 408 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Louisiana law provides that no unjust 
enrichment claim shall lie when the claim is based on a relationship that is controlled 
by an enforceable contract.”) (emphasis added); see Edwards v. Conforto, 636 So. 
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enriched and impoverished parties.273 A contract can be solemn or 
consensual;274 onerous, such as a contract of sale,275 lease,276 insurance,277 
partnership278 or distribution agreement;279 or gratuitous, such as a 
donation280 or mandate.281  
A contract also may serve as a cause for the retention of the 
enrichment, even if it is concluded between the enriched party and a third 
person.282 A typical situation involves unpaid contractors hired by the 
lessee to make improvements to leased property. If the lease contract 
supplies a justification for the lessor’s retention of these improvements, 
the contractor’s claim against the lessor must fail.283 Similar cases involve 
                                                                                                             
2d 901, 907 (La. 1993) (“[I]f there is a contract between the parties it serves as a 
legal cause, an explanation, for the enrichment.”) (emphasis added). 
 273. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., Jan. 
18, 1994, JurisData 125 (Fr.). 
 274. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., 
Nov. 5, 2009, Gaz. Pal. 2010, No. 6, p. 25, obs. D. Houtcieff and No. 141, p. 48, 
obs. H. Lecuyer (Fr.). 
 275. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] civ., May 
17, 1944, S. 1944, 1, 132 (Fr.).  
 276. Conn-Barr, L.L.C. v. Francis, 103 So. 3d 1208, 1214 (La. Ct. App. 2012) 
(holding that the sale of interest in a company constitutes legal justification for 
retention of enrichment). Accord Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for 
judicial matters] civ., Mar. 28, 1939, S. 1939, 1, 265 (Fr.). 
 277. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Oct. 
23, 2008, JurisData 45474 (Fr.). 
 278. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., Oct. 
4, 1976, Bull. civ. IV, No. 242 (Fr.). 
 279. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., Oct. 
23, 2012, JurisData Nos. 23935 and 23923; REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 
[RTDCIV] 2013, p. 114, obs. B. Fages (Fr.). 
 280. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., 
Feb. 6, 2001, JurisData 8163 (Fr.). 
 281. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ., 
Mar. 16, 1977, Bull. civ. III, No. 130 (Fr.). 
 282. Edmonston v. A-Second Mortg. Co., 289 So. 2d 116, 122 (La. 1974). See 
TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 90, No. 1068; BÉNABENT, supra note 110, No. 491. 
 283. See supra note 258; see also Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for 
judicial matters] 3e civ., May 28, 1986, JCP 1986 IV 226 (Fr.) (holding that an 
accession clause in lease contract excluded claim for restitution brought by unpaid 
contractor who was hired by lessee to install a pool on the leased property); FLOUR ET 
AL., FAIT JURIDIQUE, supra note 90, No. 47; TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 90, No. 1068; 
BÉNABENT, supra note 110, No. 491. But see infra note 287 and accompanying text. 
2018] DEMYSTIFYING ENRICHMENT WITHOUT CAUSE 1273 
 
 
 
construction contracts,284 real estate sales,285 and mortgages.286 
Nevertheless, a contract between the enriched party and a third person will 
not furnish a valid justification if such contract is a product of collusion 
between the parties.287  
In all cases, however, a contract will justify retention of the 
enrichment if such enrichment falls within the purview of the contract.288 
If additional performance is rendered, which is outside the agreed scope 
of the contract, enrichment of the recipient of such performance is not 
justified by the contract.289 Similarly, performances rendered in the pre-
contractual or post-contractual phase do not find justification in the 
contract.290  
                                                                                                             
 284. See, e.g., Century Ready Mix Corp. v. Boyte, 968 So. 2d 893 (La. Ct. 
App. 2007) (finding that a loan contract between a bank and a subcontractor 
supplied justification for retention of the bank’s enrichment).  
 285. See, e.g., Giordano v. Riverbend Rentals Co., 674 So. 2d 444 (La. Ct. 
App. 1996) (finding that payments due from sale of a house find their cause in the 
valid contract of sale, irrespective of the fact that ownership of the house was 
lost); see also Sheets Family Partners-La., Ltd. v. Inner City Refuge Econ. Dev. 
Corp., 94 So. 3d 964, 972 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that monies paid by 
prospective purchaser to mortgagee found their cause in a lease agreement 
between the two and are not recoverable by the seller upon dissolution of the sale 
upon theory of enrichment without cause).  
 286. See, e.g., Carriere v. Bank of La., 702 So. 2d 648 (La. 1996) (finding that 
mortgage contract furnishes justification for mortgagee’s enrichment from 
collection of rentals and occupation of the mortgaged property).  
 287. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, June 26, 1899, S. 
1901, 2, 167 (Fr.) (holding that an accession clause in a lease contract providing 
that lessor would keep improvements is unopposable to a contractor making such 
improvements if “there was collusion between the lessor and lessee to frustrate 
the contractor’s payment of his fee”). 
 288. See FLOUR ET AL., FAIT JURIDIQUE, supra note 90, No. 45. 
 289. Id.; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., 
May 24, 2005, JurisData 28528 (Fr.) (finding no justification for the enrichment 
occurring when a mechanic performed more extensive repairs than those agreed 
with the client). 
 290. See, e.g., Hertz Lease Plan, Inc. v. Urban Transp. & Planning Assoc., Inc., 
342 So. 2d 886 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (awarding compensation to lessor for lessee’s 
continued peaceable possession after termination of the lease); Cour de cassation 
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., July 13, 2004, JurisData 24673, 
REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL [RTDCIV] 2005, p. 120, obs. J. Mestre et B. 
Fages (Fr.) (finding no justification for use of a billboard sign by an advertising 
company even though negotiations with the owner of the sign never resulted in 
formation of a contract); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 
3e civ., May 31, 2006, JurisData 33725 (Fr.) (awarding compensation to lessee for 
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Nevertheless, French and Greek scholars291 have supported a more 
expansive construction of the term “just cause” to include any type of 
“counter-performance”292 given by a good faith enrichee for the 
enrichment, even in the absence of a juridical act. According to this theory, 
there is no enrichment for voluntary services provided in exchange for 
some material benefit received for such services, even in the absence of a 
contract.293 Likewise, enrichment from use of one’s property is justified if 
“rent” was paid, even in the absence of a valid lease agreement.294  
                                                                                                             
improvements to the leased property made after the judgment pronouncing the 
termination of the lease). 
 291. See STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 102–
30; Rouast, supra note 163, 35–40  
 292. The term “counter-performance” here is used as a literal translation of the 
French term contrepartie, denoting a counter-prestation or a value given in return 
for the enrichment. See STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra note 
10, at 105 n.17, 108, 110 n.36.  
 293. Such material benefit need not be monetary or even corporeal. See Cour de 
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., May 19, 1969, Bull. civ. 
I, No. 187 (Fr.) (holding that the education received during an apprenticeship was a 
fair counter-performance for the apprentice’s voluntary services); Tribunal de grande 
instance [TFI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Cambrai, Feb. 2, 1967: D. 1967 
Somm. 97 (Fr.) (voluntary worker on a farm received material benefit of free room 
and board). Also, enrichment deriving from services or other material benefit provided 
within concubinage can find justification in the common life of the couple. See 
Lagarde v. Dabon, 98 So. 744 (La. 1923); Simpson v. Normand, 26 So. 266 (La. 
1899); Purvis v. Purvis, 162 So. 239 (La. Ct. App. 1935); see also supra note 218. 
 294. This broader concept of “counter-performance for the enrichment” 
adequately explains the complex situations involving third party enrichments. This 
concept also provides a solid basis for the enforceability of implied in fact contracts 
(de facto contracts, contrats réels). See Morphy, Makofsky & Masson, Inc. v. Canal 
Place 2000, 538 So. 2d 569, 573 (La. 1989) (defining such a contract as “one which 
rests upon consent implied from facts and circumstances showing mutual intention 
to contract [and] not different in their legal effect from express, written 
agreements”); see also Succession of Pereuilhet, 23 La. Ann. 294, 295 (1871) (“For 
actions without words, either written or spoken, are presumptive evidence of a 
contract, where they are done under circumstances that naturally imply a consent to 
such a contract.”). In essence, the justification of the enrichment is the legal cause 
for such contracts. See STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, 
at 103–04; ZIMMERMANN, supra note 23, at 22–24. Cf. Cour de cassation [Cass.] 
[supreme court for judicial matters] com., May 9, 1985, JurisData 1232 (Fr.) 
(involving a de facto lease in which the lessee remained in the property after the 
termination of the lease); Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 5e ch., 
May 22, 1984, JurisData 23657 (Fr.) (concerning a de facto employment contract 
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ii. The Law 
When a specific legal rule justifies retention of the enrichment, “an 
action must not be allowed to defeat the purpose of said rule.”295 Several 
legal provisions directly furnish a title for retention of the enrichment on 
the basis of the overarching principle of unjustified enrichment. This 
category is broad and encompasses many situations that involve several 
areas of the law, including the laws of property,296 family,297 and 
successions.298 The most frequently occurring situations specific to the law 
of obligations include failed juridical acts, natural obligations, “quasi-
contracts,” and judicial decisions. 
ii-a. Failed Juridical Acts 
When a juridical act fails, the usual remedy calls for restoration of the 
parties to their pre-existing patrimonial positions by application of the 
rules on nullity as lex specialis. Nevertheless, retention of a performance 
                                                                                                             
in which the employee continued working despite the invalidity of the original 
employment contract). 
 295. Carriere v. Bank of Louisiana, 702 So. 2d 648, 657 (La. 1996); Bd. of 
Sup’rs of La. State Univ. v. La. Agric. Fin. Auth., 984 So. 2d 72, 81 (La. Ct. App. 
2008); Coastal Envtl. Specialists, Inc. v. Chem-Lig Int’l, Inc., 818 So. 2d 12, 19 (La. 
Ct. App. 2001). 
 296. The laws of accession, for instance, regulate the ownership of 
improvements made on the property of another and provide for compensation based 
on considerations of unjustified enrichment. See supra note 243 and accompanying 
text. But see also supra note 260.  
 297. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., May 
2, 1979, D. 1979, inf. rap. 432 (Fr.) & Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for 
judicial matters] 1e civ., Nov. 7, 1995, JurisData 3824 (Fr.) (finding that marital 
obligations of support and assistance between spouses provide justification for any 
claimed enrichment). Cf. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 98 (2018). See supra notes 215–
216 and accompanying text.  
 298. See supra note 209. Other examples can be found in the Louisiana Revised 
Statutes, such as LA. REV. STAT. § 9:4801 (2018) (Louisiana Private Works Act); 
see J.P. Mack Indus., L.L.C. v. Mosaic Fertilizer, L.L.C., 970 F. Supp. 2d 516, 521 
(E.D. La. 2013) (availability of remedy under Private Works Act precluded 
subcontractor to recover under a theory of enrichment without cause); see also LA. 
REV. STAT. § 12:1-622(C) (Louisiana Business Corporation Act) (imposing 
personal liability on shareholders who receive corporate distributions in excess of 
what may be authorized by law); GLENN G. MORRIS & WENDELL H. HOLMES, 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 44:17, in 8 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 
2017) (discussing shareholders’ liability for wrongful distributions under the “unjust 
enrichment type of liability”). 
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or benefit from the failed contract may still be justified by application of 
the provisions on nullity or dissolution. If the contract is null, restoration 
can be excluded under the clean hands doctrine.299 Thus, collection of 
commission payments to a real estate broker on the basis of a commission 
agreement that was void ab initio will not be restored if the payer knew or 
should have known of the nullity.300 Likewise, claims for restoration and 
restitution arising from a failed “agreement” between the proprietor of a 
casino establishment and a patron concerning the exclusive use of a slot 
machine that would “hit the jackpot soon” were not actionable.301 In this 
context, however, null juridical acts should be kept separate from 
inexistent acts. If an act is inexistent,302 that is, if a contract was never 
formed, then the provisions on enrichment without cause could apply.303 
                                                                                                             
 299. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2033 cmt. b. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS II, supra 
note 163, § 94 (discussing the clean hands doctrine in the context of the bona fide 
purchase doctrine); Saúl Litvinoff, Contract, Delict, Morals, and Law, 45 LOY. L. 
REV. 1, 6–8 (1999) (comparing theories of recovery under contract and tort). In the 
case of dissolution of a contract, retention of a performance or recovery for a 
performance will be permitted “[i]f partial performance has been rendered and that 
performance is of value to the party seeking to dissolve the contract.” LA. CIV. CODE 
ANN. art. 2018. See supra notes 186, 236. The doctrines of nullity and dissolution also 
provide for the protection of innocent third parties whose interests are not impaired by 
the effects of restoration. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2021, 2035. 
 300. Pique Severn Ave. P’ship v. Ballen, 773 So. 2d 179, 181 (La. Ct. App. 
2000); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2033. 
 301. Master v. Red River Entm’t, L.L.C., 188 So. 3d 284, 285 (La. Ct. App. 
2016). Also, there is no recovery on theory of unjustified enrichment if the implied 
contract is illegal. See Jary v. Emmett, 234 So. 2d 530 (La. Ct. App. 1970); Fox v. 
Sloo, 10 La. Ann. 11 (1855). If, however, the contract is void as being malum 
prohibitum and not malum in se, recovery on the basis of enrichment without cause 
is allowed. See Jones v. City of Lake Charles, 295 So. 2d 914, 917–18 (La. Ct. App. 
1974); Coleman v. Bossier City, 305 So. 2d 444 (La. 1974). The recovery in these 
cases can also be based on the de facto contract theory discussed supra note 294. 
 302. On the difference between inexistent and absolutely null juridical acts, 
see 3 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & BONNECASE, supra note 173, Nos. 11–26; 1 
PLANIOL I, supra note 93, Nos. 345, 348; see also Scalise, Jr., supra note 103, at 
696–97 (“[A] third and lesser-known subclass of these types of [absolute] nullities 
exists. This final subclass . . . consists of acts that are null not because they violate 
public policy but because they are permanently defective insofar as they are not 
really juridical acts at all; they are inexistent acts.”). 
 303. This distinction becomes relevant in light of the discussion of quantum 
meruit in Louisiana law. See generally LITVINOFF, DAMAGES, supra note 30, § 
14.25; Nicholas II, supra note 91, at 56–62 (discussing the types of quantum 
meruit in Louisiana law); Jeffrey Oakes, Article 2298, the Codification of the 
Principle Forbidding Unjust Enrichment, and the Elimination of Quantum Meruit 
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ii-b. Natural Obligations 
Natural obligations provide lawful justification for retaining the 
enrichment.304 Judicial decisions are consistent with this approach.305 
                                                                                                             
as a Basis for Recovery in Louisiana, 56 LA. L. REV. 873, 880–85 (1995) 
(discussing the history of quantum meruit in Louisiana law). As discussed in Cent. 
Facilities Operating Co. v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 3d 700, 707 (M.D. 
La. 2014),  
Louisiana law recognizes two types of quantum meruit: contractual 
quantum meruit and quasi contractual quantum meruit. . . . To recover 
on a contractual quantum meruit theory, an agreement must exist 
between the parties. . . . To recover under a quasi-contractual quantum 
meruit theory, the plaintiff must confer a benefit on the defendant 
pursuant to a contract it believed to be valid but was actually void. 
(emphasis added). Perhaps more accurately, if a contract is null, recovery of a 
price will be governed by the provisions of nullity. Art. 2033. If a valid contract 
is dissolved, recovery will be subject to special rules. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 
2018–21. But if there never was a contract, that is, if a contract is inexistent, 
restitution will be made pursuant to the rules of enrichment without cause. LA. 
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2298. Thus, a lack of the meeting of the minds between 
customer and diesel engine repair company as to the price for repair works leads 
to an inexistent contract. Recovery of a fair market price will be based on 
enrichment without cause. Ricky’s Diesel Serv., Inc. v. Pinell, 906 So. 2d 536, 
539 (La. Ct. App. 2005); Villars v. Edwards, 412 So. 2d 122 (La. Ct. App. 1982); 
see also Mark A. Gravel Prop., L.L.C v. Eddies BBQ, L.L.C., 139 So. 3d 653, 
657–58 (La. Ct. App. 2014) (“[W]here there is no meeting of the minds between 
the parties the contract is void for lack of consent.”) (emphasis added). But see 
also Lyons Milling Co. v. Cusimano, 108 So. 414 (La. 1926) (characterizing a 
lack of the meeting of the minds as a case of mutual error). Restoration because 
of rescission of a contract, however, will be governed by the rules on nullity, 
unless additional performances have been rendered after the rescission of the 
contract. But see Semco, L.L.C. v. Grant, Ltd., 221 So. 3d 1004, 1030 (“If 
rescission is granted, there is no enforceable contract and the equitable doctrine 
of unjust enrichment may apply.” (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 2298)).  
 304. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1761; see also LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN 
GENERAL, supra note 97, §§ 2.1, 2.7 (defining natural obligations and discussing their 
effect on quasi-contracts); Smith, supra note 43, at 17–18 (discussing the usefulness 
of natural obligations in the characterization of contracts within the theory of cause). 
 305. See, e.g., Webb v. Webb, 835 So. 2d 713 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (dismissing 
nephew’s claim that his aunt was unjustly enriched by his unpaid services because 
nephew’s natural obligation justified aunt’s enrichment); Cour de cassation 
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] req., June 25, 1872: D. 74, 1, 16, S. 
73, 1, 129 (Fr.) (finding that grandmother’s maintenance and education expenses 
for the benefit of her grandchild constituted a natural obligation that excluded her 
unjustified enrichment claim); see also supra note 240.  
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When a gratuity is prompted by beneficence of the grantor or by feelings 
of affection or devotion toward the beneficiary, an action de in rem verso 
cannot be brought against the beneficiary.306 Such a feeling obviously 
hinders the enrichment action between the person who felt it and the 
person who inspired it.307 Services provided among family members are 
presumed gratuitous.308 The provision of gratuitous services will serve as 
a cause for the retention of the enrichment in the hands of the recipient of 
such services, even in cases in which the provision of these services was 
prompted by an ulterior motive that was not realized.309  
A prescribed action also gives rise to a natural obligation,310 thus 
justifying retention of enrichment. This justification, in turn, explains why 
                                                                                                             
 306. This rule has been accepted since the early jurisprudence. See New 
Orleans, Ft. J. & G.I.R. Co. v. Turcan, 15 So. 187, 189 (La. 1894); Watson v. 
Ledoux, 8 La. Ann. 68, 68 (1853) (holding that “services rendered voluntarily to 
preserve another man’s property from destruction [by flood] are presumed to be 
gratuitous, and give no cause of action”). But see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2292; 
see also Tilghman v. Lewis’s Estate, 8 La. 105 (1835); Jacob v. Ursuline Nuns, 2 
Mart. (O.S.) 269 (1812); Ayland v. Rice, 23 La. Ann. 75 (1871); White v. Jones, 
14 La. Ann. 681 (1859) (all holding that no compensation can be awarded for 
services that are purely gratuitous in nature).  
 307. It is questionable whether third persons who have benefited from a donation 
are answerable for this benefit under the theory of enrichment without cause. The 
answer is clearly negative if the third person is an intended beneficiary. LA. CIV. 
CODE ANN. art. 1978. The issue, however, is not as straightforward if the third 
person is an incidental beneficiary. See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] 
Nancy, Apr. 29, 1893, S. 95, 2, 209 (Fr.) (awarding compensation to plaintiff who 
donated money to a religious community for improvements made to a school 
operated by the community but owned by a local municipality that later took over 
the operation of the school and was sued by plaintiff on theory of enrichment 
without cause); see also McWilliams v. Hagan, 4 Rob. 374, 376 (La. 1843) (“In the 
absence of any privity [between plaintiff and defendant], a very strong case must be 
made out, to justify the application of the maxim, that no man should be permitted 
to enrich himself at the expense of another, as a ground of recovery.”).  
 308. See Kiper v. Kiper, 38 So. 2d 507 (La. 1948); Succession of Berthelot, 24 
So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App. 1945); Latour v. Guillory, 64 So. 130 (La. 1914); see 
also supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
 309. Hanger One MLU, Inc. v. Unopened Succession of Rogers, 981 So. 2d 
175 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (dismissing unjustified enrichment claim of plaintiff who 
provided gratuitous services for collection and storage of defendants’ damaged 
aircraft in hopes of securing a lease of a hangar from the defendants who 
eventually refused to lease to plaintiff). 
 310. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1762(1). See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN 
GENERAL, supra note 97, § 2.5. 
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courts steadily dismiss claims of enrichment without cause when a 
personal action has prescribed.311 
ii-c. Quasi-Contracts 
The more specific provisions governing negotiorum gestio312 and 
restoration of a payment of a thing not due313 also will exclude recovery 
on the basis of the more general action for enrichment without cause. 
Similarly, a claim of enrichment without cause can compensate314 for an 
adverse enrichment claim, thus providing justification for retention of 
“counter-enrichments.” For instance, a purported business partner’s 
unjustified enrichment claim for making improvements to his putative 
partner’s building was offset by an adverse unjustified enrichment claim 
of the latter partner for the former partner’s exclusive use of the 
building.315  
ii-d. Judicial Decisions 
Civilian theory accepts that judicial decisions can constitute lawful 
justification for retention of the enrichment.316 Thus, if a decision is 
                                                                                                             
 311. See, e.g., Dugas v. Thompson, 71 So. 3d 1059 (La. Ct. App. 2011).  
 312. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2292. 
 313. Id. art. 2299. 
 314. Id. art. 1893. 
 315. Munro v. Carstensen, 945 So. 2d 961, 966 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 
 316. An example is the judicial determination of the liability of solidary obligors. 
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1804 cmt. b; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, 
supra note 97, §§ 7.78–7.82; see also Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for 
judicial matters] 3e civ., Nov. 14, 1973, Bull civ. III, No. 580 (Fr.) (holding that the 
lower court’s judicial allocation of responsibility among two solidary obligors 
constituted “just cause” that prevented any claim of unjustified enrichment made by 
the obligor who was charged with the larger virile portion). Cf. Ill. Cent. Gulf R. Co. 
v. Deaton, Inc., 581 So. 2d 714 (La. Ct. App 1991); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. 
Standard Cas. & Sur. Co., 3 So. 2d 463 (La. Ct. App 1941) (both holding that a joint 
tortfeasor who only is statutorily liable and makes payment to injured party has a 
quasi-contractual right of contribution against the responsible tortfeasor); see also 
Scott v. Wesley, 589 So. 2d 26, 28 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (“[I]n cases where a claim has 
been exercised and a judgment obtained, it is most apparent that there is a practical 
remedy available at law,” precluding application of the theory of enrichment without 
cause.); Gasaway–Bankston v. C.P. Land, L.L.C., No. 2014-CA-1749, 2015 WL 
3548099, at *3 (La. Ct. App. June 5, 2015) (dismissing architectural firm’s unjustified 
enrichment claim against the buyer of the immovable because the architectural firm 
had already secured a judgment against the developer for the full amount owed under 
the contract).  
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overturned on appeal, there is no lawful justification for retaining 
payments made on the basis of the overturned decision.317  
b. Absence of Other Remedy: Subsidiarity of the Action 
Enrichment without cause is a subsidiary remedy, meaning that this 
action is admissible only when there is no other available remedy at law.318 
This juridical requirement has been debated in several civilian jurisdictions, 
including Louisiana.319 The controversy stems from the fact that there is a 
great degree of overlap between lack of cause and subsidiarity. Some writers 
argue that a proper understanding of cause should provide adequate 
guidance to the courts, which instead rely too heavily on the subsidiary 
nature of this remedy.320 Other writers, as well as the prevailing 
jurisprudence in France and Louisiana, consider subsidiarity the prevalent 
                                                                                                             
 317. City Fin. Corp. v. Bonnie, 762 So. 2d 167 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (holding 
debtor responsible for restitution but not debtor’s attorney who had a cause for 
retaining the funds as attorney’s fees). But see also Phipps v. Chesson, 682 So. 2d 
935, 938 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Stegall v. Orr Motors of Little Rock, Inc., 165 So. 
3d 264, 268 (La. Ct. App. 2015) (both holding that amounts paid in excess of a 
judgment are subject to restitution). 
 318. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2298 ; cf. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 
1303-3 (2018) (Fr.). 
 319. Subsidiarity of this action is accepted, with variations, in most civilian 
jurisdictions, but not without debate. See Alexis Posez, La subsidiarité de 
l’enrichissement sans cause: étude de droit français à la lumière du droit 
comparé, 67 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARE 185 (2014); see also P. 
Drakidis, La “subsidiarité”, caractère spécifique et international de l’action 
d’enrichissement sans cause, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL [RTDCIV] 
1961, p. 577, 589 (characterizing this requirement as “equivocal”); G. Viney, note 
under Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., June 
3, 1997, JCP 1998, II, 10102 (Fr.) (arguing that this requirement is “obscure”). 
The initial draft of Article 2298 of the Louisiana Civil Code, as proposed by the 
Quasi-Contracts Committee of the Louisiana State Law Institute, had eliminated 
subsidiarity as a requirement. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Editor’s note under article 
2298, in WEST’S LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE, VOL. I (2017); Martin, supra note 1, at 
69; Oakes, supra note 303, at 900 n.175. 
 320. See Tate I, supra note 113, at 888–89; Martin, supra note 1, at 69. 
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juridical requirement321 while acknowledging that there is some overlap 
with the lack of cause.322 
The truth lies somewhere in the middle.323 The overlap between lack 
of cause and subsidiarity is considerable but not complete. Subsidiarity 
coincides with lack of cause whenever there is a lawful justification for 
retention of the enrichment. Indeed, if a juridical act or the law furnishes 
title for retention of the enrichment, the action for unjustified enrichment 
will fail predominantly because of the lack of cause.324 Also, when the law 
provides for a more specific remedy, such as in the case of a null juridical 
act or the dissolution of a contract, these provisions will supply the rule of 
decision as lex specialis.325 In such cases, the requirement of subsidiarity 
is redundant because justification of the enrichment or the existence of 
more special legal rules will exclude the action anyway.326  
                                                                                                             
 321. Walters v. MedSouth Record Mgmt., L.L.C., 38 So. 3d 243, 244 (La. 
2010); Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ. v. La. Agric. Fin. Auth., 984 So. 2d 72, 
80–81 (La. Ct. App. 2008); Coastal Envtl. Specialists, Inc. v. Chem-Lig Int’l, Inc., 
818 So. 2d 12, 19 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (all finding that “where there is a rule of 
law directed to the issue, an action must not be allowed to defeat the purpose of 
said rule . . . stated differently, unjust enrichment principles are only applicable to 
fill a gap in the law where no express remedy is provided.”); Nicholas II, supra 
note 91, at 66 (noting that the requirement of subsidiarity existed in the early, pre-
Minyard Louisiana jurisprudence); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for 
judicial matters] 1e civ., June 18, 2014, JCP 2014, 998, note G. Loiseau (Fr.); P. 
Rémy, Le principe de subsidiarité de l’action de in rem verso en droit français, in 
L’ENRICHISSEMENT SANS CAUSE. LA CLASSIFICATION DES SOURCES DES 
OBLIGATIONS 59 (V. Mannino & C. Ophèle eds., 2007). 
 322. See MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 164, No. 706; Drakidis, supra note 319, 
at 577; Schewe & Richelle, supra note 113, 663, 666–70 (arguing in favor of the 
subsidiarity principle despite the overlap with lack of cause).  
 323. Subsidiarity, as a requirement, appeared in the writings of AUBRY & RAU, 
supra note 6, No. 578, but it was adopted by French jurisprudence as a reaction to 
the rather extensive holding in the Boudier case. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] 
[supreme court for judicial matters] civ., May 12, 1914, S. 1918, 1, 41 (Fr.); Cour 
de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] civ., Mar. 2, 1915, D. 1920, 
1, 102 (Fr.); Rouast, supra note 163, at 35–40; 2 PLANIOL I, supra note 65, No. 935.  
 324. 7 PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 164, No. 763; MARTY & RAYNAUD, 
supra note 81, No. 354; MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 164, No. 710. 
 325. MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 164, No. 710. 
 326. FLOUR ET AL., FAIT JURIDIQUE, supra note 90, No. 54. See 2 PLANIOL I, 
supra note 65, No. 937A, at 550 (“In reality, if in these different cases, the action 
de in rem verso does not lie, it is because the relations of the parties, being fixed 
by the contract or by the legal rule of responsibility, there is no need to make use 
of the concept of unjust enrichment. The person enriched has the right to keep the 
enrichment, and the measure in which he is held is determined by the application 
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The subsidiarity rule actually comes into play when there is no 
justification for the retention of the enrichment, but there is still another 
available remedy at law.327 French scholars, however, do not mention any 
concrete examples of such a situation.328 It is submitted that actions in 
delict or quasi-delict are the main cases in which the rule of subsidiarity is 
not overshadowed by the requirement of lack of cause. For instance, in a 
case of a tort by conversion, the tortfeasor has no justification for retaining 
the thing, yet the victim has an action in tort that precludes an action for 
enrichment without cause pursuant to the subsidiarity rule. It is further 
submitted that, although the cases of delict and quasi-delict present 
examples of direct application of the subsidiarity rule, subsidiarity seems 
impractical here. Indeed, a litigant would be ill-advised to pursue mere 
restitution on the basis of enrichment without cause instead of seeking 
redress and full recovery by application of the law of damages.329 Further, 
the preference in favor of the delictual action is better achieved through 
application of the civilian maxim lex specialis derogat lege generali.330 
Thus, the debate on subsidiarity presents a false dilemma. Be that as it 
may, the jurisprudence overwhelmingly endorses this rule.331 
                                                                                                             
of other juridical rules.”). This approach is gaining support in Greek 
jurisprudence. See Areios Pagos [A.P.] [Supreme Court] 859/2003, ELLINIKI 
DIKAIOSYNI (HELLENIC JUSTICE JOURNAL) 2004, p. 144 (Greece) (“[S]ubsidiarity 
is not an additional requirement for an unjustified enrichment claim. It simply 
derives from . . . the basis of the claim for unjustified enrichment, which is the 
lack of legal cause.”).  
 327. MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 164, No. 710. 
 328. Id. But see Nicholas III, supra note 113, at 14–26 (discussing variable 
situations in which the question of subsidiary may arise).  
 329. One plausible, albeit theoretical, explanation could be the plaintiff’s 
inability to establish liability on the part of the tortfeasor. See STATHOPOULOS, 
CONTRACT LAW, supra note 126, at 248; Nicholas III, supra note 113, at 15. 
Especially with respect to the Louisiana tort of conversion, see supra note 231. 
 330. “The special law overrides the general law.” See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL 
LAW SYSTEM, supra note 96, at 239; see also Posez, supra note 319, at 185. When 
a delictual action is available, application of the special rules for a shorter 
prescription of the delictual action also will apply and establish a natural obligation 
serving as the lawful cause for the enrichment. See supra notes 304, 311. 
 331. MARTY & RAYNAUD, supra note 81, No. 354. The accessory nature of the 
actio de in rem verso is appealing to French and Louisiana judges because it also 
achieves a necessary “economy of means” in civil procedure. See BÉNABENT, 
supra note 110, No. 485. Conversely, an action for a payment of a thing not due 
is rightly characterized as an independent, not subsidiary, action. A good 
illustration of the need for this distinction can be found in the case of an 
enrichment ob turpem vel injustam causam. In the case of a tort of conversion, for 
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Enrichment without cause, therefore, is excluded when the 
impoverished plaintiff can seek another remedy. This alternative remedy 
can be legal,332 contractual,333 quasi-contractual,334 delictual,335 or quasi-
delictual.336 Usually, the available action will be directed against the 
enriched party.337 It is possible, however, that the existence of a remedy 
against a third party, that is, a person other than the enriched, will exclude 
                                                                                                             
example, two separate causes of action can be contemplated—that of the tort 
itself, which is subject to a liberative prescription of one year; and that for the 
claim of restitution of the thing as a “thing not due,” which is subject to a ten-year 
prescriptive period. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2299 cmt. c (2018); see also 
Whitten v. Monkhouse, 29 So. 2d 800, 804 (La. Ct. App. 1947); Cumis Ins. Soc’y, 
Inc. v. Hill, 574 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. La. 1983). 
 332. An example would be a claim for child support payments or fulfillment 
of other parental obligations. See Vaccari v. Vaccari, 50 So. 3d 139, 142 (La. 
2010); Guillot v. Munn, 756 So. 2d 290, 295–96 (La. 2000); State Dep’t. of 
Children and Family Servs. v. Charles, 131 So. 3d 1054, 1058 (La. Ct. App. 2013). 
For other examples from the Louisiana Revised Statutes, see supra note 298.  
 333. Audio Plus, Inc. v. Lombardino, 105 So. 3d 725 (La. Ct. App. 2012) 
(contract for remodeling); Pinnacle Operating Co. v. Ettco Enter., Inc., 914 So. 
2d 1144 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (contract of assignment of rights); Hall v. James, 986 
So. 2d 817 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (mineral lease); Cour de cassation [Cass.] 
[supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Oct. 24, 1973, Bull. civ. I No. 280 
(Fr.) (contract of assignment of rights); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court 
for judicial matters] com., Apr. 23, 2013, JurisData 7881 (Fr.) (services contract); 
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ., 1 Feb., 
1989, JurisData 399 (Fr.) (contract of lease). This should include actions 
stemming from the nullity or dissolution of a contract. 
 334. See Symeon C. Symeonides & Nicole Duarte Martin, The New Law of 
Co-Ownership: A Kommentar, 68 TUL. L. REV. 69, 99–102 (1993) (arguing that 
a co-owner’s action for enrichment without cause is subordinate to an existing 
action in negotiorum gestio); see also Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court 
for judicial matters] 1e civ., Mar. 16, 2004, JurisData 22990 (Fr.) (negotiorum 
gestio); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., July 
5, 1989, JurisData 702693 (Fr.) (payment of a thing not due). 
 335. Walters v. MedSouth Record Mgmt., L.L.C., 38 So. 3d 245 (La. 2010); Cour 
d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Jan. 28, 1982, JurisData 20867 (Fr.). 
 336. The alternative remedy may also include breach of the duty of good faith 
and fiduciary duties. See Westbrook v. Pike Elec., L.L.C., 799 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. 
La. 2011); Zaveri v. Condor Petroleum Corp., 27 F. Supp. 3d 695 (W.D. La. 2014).  
 337. 7 PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 164, No. 763; Cour de cassation [Cass.] 
[supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Oct. 24, 1973, Bull. civ. I, No. 280 (Fr.). 
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the action of enrichment without cause.338 The term “remedy” has been 
construed broadly to include not only personal but also real actions.339 
But it may happen that the action the plaintiff normally has against her 
direct debtor cannot be exercised because of a factual obstacle that is 
beyond the plaintiff’s control or without any negligence on her part. When 
that is the case, the requirement of subsidiarity is waived, and the plaintiff 
will be allowed to bring the actio de in rem verso against the party holding 
the enrichment if the other requirements for the action are met.340 
Insolvency of the debtor is a usual example of such a factual obstacle.341 
When allowing the action in such cases, French courts have scrutinized 
closely the obligee’s duty of good faith. Thus, courts have refused the 
                                                                                                             
 338. See Soileau v. ABC Ins. Co., 844 So. 2d 108, 111 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (client 
who had a claim against accountant could not sue third person for restitution of funds 
embezzled by accountant and given to third person); Coastal Envtl. Specialists, Inc. v. 
Chem-Lig Int’l, Inc., 818 So. 2d 12, 19–20 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (environmental 
cleanup company had a remedy at law against lessee that contaminated soil that 
precluded company’s claim of unjust enrichment against lessor); Insulation Techs., 
Inc. v. Indus. Labor & Equip. Servs., Inc., 122 So. 3d 1146, 1151 (La. Ct. App. 2013) 
(existence of contractual remedy against general contractor precluded subcontractor 
from maintaining cause of action for unjust enrichment against the owner of the 
project); see also Marseilles Homeowners Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Broadmoor, L.L.C., 
111 So. 3d 1099 (La. Ct. App. 2013); Pinegrove Elec. Supply Co., Inc. v. Cat Key 
Constr., Inc., 88 So. 3d 1097 (La. Ct. App. 2012); Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ. v. 
La. Agric. Fin. Auth., 984 So. 2d 72 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (availability of remedy under 
the Public Works Act precludes a claim for enrichment without cause). 
 339. Finova Cap. Corp. v. IT Corp., 774 So. 2d 1129, 1132 (La. Ct. App. 2000) 
(holding that plaintiff who held security interest in subcontractor’s equipment had 
other available remedies, including foreclosing on equipment and seeking writ of 
sequestration); Builders Supply of Ruston, Inc. v. Qualls, 750 So. 2d 427, 431 (La. Ct. 
App. 2000) (finding that supplier of building materials failed to avail himself of 
statutory rights and remedies governing claims and privileges). See Jim Walter 
Homes, Inc. v. Jessen, 732 So. 2d 699, 706 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that contractor 
failed to take measures to secure his claim of unpaid fee for constructing a house).  
 340. 7 PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 164, No. 763; Cour de cassation [Cass.] 
[supreme court for judicial matters] req., Nov. 23, 1908, S. 1910, 1, 425, note 
Naquet (Fr.) (holding that the actio de in rem verso must fail if a justification for 
retention of the enrichment exists in a contract between the third party and the 
original insolvent debtor). 
 341. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Jan. 
14, 2003, JurisData 17242, DEFRENOIS 2003, p. 259, obs. J.-L. Aubert, REVUE 
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL [RTDCIV] 2003, p. 295, obs. J. Mestre et B. Fages 
(Fr.). See Nicholas I, supra note 11, at 640.  
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action when the plaintiff, out of gross negligence, neglected to secure her 
claim or to bring suit prior to her debtor’s insolvency.342  
This exception does not apply, however, when the plaintiff’s alternative 
remedy is barred because of a legal obstacle. In such a case, subsidiarity is 
not waived and the action for enrichment without cause must fail. Liberative 
prescription of the alternative action is the prime example of a legal 
obstacle.343 Res judicata is another example.344 Arguably, failure to produce 
evidence to sustain an alternative remedy is a third example.345 The mere 
                                                                                                             
 342. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] req. July 11, 
1889, S. 1890, 1, 97, note Labbé (Fr.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for 
judicial matters] civ. Feb. 12, 1923, 1, 129, note Rouast (Fr.). This opinion is also 
supported in doctrine. See 7 PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 164, No. 762. 
 343. See, e.g., Dugas v. Thompson, 71 So. 3d 1059 (La. Ct. App. 2011). 
Especially for the case of liberative prescription, explanation for the exclusion of 
the action can be found in the theory of cause, given that a prescribed action 
constitutes a natural obligation. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1762 (2018). But see 
Nicholas I, supra note 11, at 636–39 (discussing the difficulties in distinguishing a 
“legal” obstacle from a “factual” one). 
 344. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., May 
27, 2010, REVUE JURIDIQUE PERSONNES ET FAMILLE [RJPF] 2010, p. 20, obs. T. Garé 
(Fr.) (holding that, if the preclusive effect of a divorce decree does not extend to 
patrimonial issues, a claim of enrichment without cause would be admissible).  
 345. See, e.g., Troxler v. Breaux, 105 So. 3d 944, 949–50 (La. Ct. App. 2012) 
(failure of a plaintiff cohabitant to produce evidence of an agreement for shared 
costs with defendant cohabitant did not provide grounds for an action in enrichment 
without cause); Johnson v. State, 510 So. 2d 87, 90–92 (La. Ct. App. 1987) 
(employee failed to prove a cause of action for workers’ compensation); Current 
French jurisprudence, however, seems split on this issue. Compare Cour de 
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., June 3 1997, JCP 1998 
II 10102, note G. Viney (Fr.) (actio de in rem verso allowed although plaintiff had 
failed to prove delictual fault), with Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for 
judicial matters] 1e civ., Mar. 31, 2011, JurisData 4877, D. 2011, p. 2891, obs. I. 
Gelbard-Le Dauphin (Fr.) (dismissing an actio de in rem verso of a plaintiff who 
had failed to produce evidence of the existence of a loan agreement). Courts 
sometimes have relied erroneously on this solution, however, when the exclusion of 
the action should be sought on other grounds. See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.] 
[supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ., Apr. 29, 197, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE 
DROIT CIVIL [RTDCIV] 1971, p. 872, obs. Loussouarn (Fr.) (providing that 
contractor’s unjustified enrichment claim against his former concubine for 
improvements he made to defendant’s property was dismissed because of his 
inability to produce evidence of the existence of a contract). Perhaps a better 
explanation would have been that the plaintiff’s liberality served as a cause for the 
defendant’s enrichment. Be that as it may, this case also illustrates the great degree 
of overlap between cause and subsidiarity.  
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existence of an alternative remedy, and not the remedy’s likelihood of 
success, will suffice.346 
These variations in the jurisprudence should be seen as evidence of 
the functional role of subsidiarity, which is the only aspect that realistically 
sets it apart from lack of cause.347 Indeed, as an instrument of equity, the 
actio de in rem verso must be deployed when not doing so would bring 
about an unfair result. Although it may seem contrary to equity to allow a 
plaintiff who fails to present proof for her cause of action to be heard on 
different grounds, sometimes resorting to equity may be excused, even in 
such circumstances.348 
Finally, the rule of subsidiarity, as crafted by French and Louisiana 
jurisprudence, is substantive rather than procedural. Thus, the plaintiff is 
precluded from bringing an action for enrichment without cause when 
another remedy is available. It should not mean, however, that the same 
plaintiff should be precluded from pleading enrichment without cause in 
the alternative. In fact, the litigant is only charged with presenting the facts 
of the case, which are characterized appropriately by the court, pursuant 
to the long standing civilian maxim iura novit curia.349 Although this is 
                                                                                                             
 346. See Garber v. Badon & Ranier, 981 So. 2d 92, 100 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (“[I]t 
is not the success or failure of other causes of the action, but rather the existence of 
other causes of action, that determine whether unjust enrichment can be applied.”). 
 347. See Tate II, supra note 113, at 466 (“In an action by an impoverished 
plaintiff against a defendant enriched without legal justification, subsidiarity has 
functional value.”). 
 348. See also Rémy, supra note 321, at 59–60; Y.-M. Laithier, observations 
under Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., June 
25, 2008, JurisData 44518, REVUE DES CONTRATS 2008, No. 4, p. 1138 (Fr.). 
 349. “The court knows the law.” See Gulfstream Servs., Inc. v. Hot Energy 
Servs., Inc., 907 So. 2d 96, 101 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (“Although Gulfstream did 
not plead enrichment without cause by name, Louisiana remains a fact pleading 
state and ‘[n]o technical forms of pleading are required.’ LA. C.C.P. art. 854; 
Baker v. Maclay Props. Co., 648 So. 2d 888, 896–97 (La. 1995), . . . . Thus, the 
threshold inquiry is whether Gulfstream pled or raised, without objection, a claim 
for enrichment without cause.”). 
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clearly the case in France350 and Greece,351 it only appears to be the case 
in Louisiana.352 
This overview of the requirements of enrichment without cause under 
the lens of its true general characteristics reveals a falsehood: Enrichment 
without cause is not a gap filling device. It is a remedy for restitution that 
is more scarcely deployed because of the broad conception of restoration 
and restitution on the basis of the doctrines of cause and nullity.  
CONCLUSION 
Civilian equity is not a separate branch of the law, living outside the 
civil code.353 Equity permeates the civil law system in the form of long 
standing general principles of the law. It is true that unjustified enrichment 
is one of these fundamental principles of equity. It is partly true that 
unjustified enrichment and enrichment without cause are one and the 
same. Rather, enrichment without cause is only one expression of the 
principle of unjustified enrichment. The doctrines of cause and nullity also 
express this principle by virtue of several specific legal rules. It is a sheer 
falsehood that enrichment without cause, formerly actio de in rem verso, 
“intruded” the Civil Code as a judge-made device and must therefore be 
                                                                                                             
 350. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., 
June 23, 2010, JurisData 9986, REVUE DES CONTRATS 2010, No. 4, p. 1370, obs. 
C. Goldie-Genicon (Fr.). 
 351. Also, nothing should prevent a defendant from arguing enrichment 
without cause as a defense in the form of an exception. Justification for this 
conclusion can be found in a long-standing Roman maxim allowing the defendant 
to use a subordinate action as a shield instead of a sword. See DIG. 50.17.156.1 
(Ulpian, Ad Edictum 70) (“It has been said that a[n] [exception] falls even more 
readily to someone to whom we grant actions.”) and 43.18.1.4 (Ulpian, Ad 
Edictum 70) (“For when we grant an action to anyone, he will be considered all 
the more entitled to a[n] [exception].”); BALIS, supra note 65, § 136, at 362–63.   
 352. Perez v. Util. Constructors, Inc., 2016 WL 5930877, at *2 n.5 (E.D. La. 
Oct. 12, 2016) (“The Court acknowledges that there appears to be a degree of 
confusion on this issue. Some sections of this Court have held that unjust 
enrichment can never be pled in the alternative, while other sections have held 
that alternative pleading is permissible.” (citing Carriere v. Bank of Louisiana, 
702 So. 2d 648, 658 (La. 1996))). In Carriere, the Supreme Court of Louisiana 
discussed plaintiffs’ claims for enrichment without cause which were pleaded in 
the alternative to contract claims without dismissing claim because of the 
alternative pleading). Carriere, 702 So. 2d at 671–74. 
 353. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 96, at 182 (“In 
Louisiana and in France, there is no formal division between strict law and equity. . 
. . Equity is built into the law.”).  
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kept in austere confinement. In fact, this remains one of the most long-
lived misunderstandings in the law, dating back to Domat and Savigny.  
This Article attempts to reintroduce enrichment without cause, 
through a historical, critical, and comparative examination of its scope of 
application. It is hoped that Louisiana doctrine and the jurisprudence will 
engage in further discourse, leading to a Louisiana model of enrichment 
without cause devoid of mysteries. Finally, it is true, sadly, that the 
“Beautiful Civil Law of Louisiana,”354 enriched by the monumental work 
of one of her most prolific admirers—Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos—is 
now impoverished by his passing. We pay tribute to our departed teacher, 
colleague, and friend, as we continue to guard Thermopylae.355  
 
                                                                                                             
 354. A.N. Yiannopoulos, On the Bicentenary of the Louisiana Supreme Court: 
Chronicle of the Creation of a Unique and Beautiful Legal Tradition, 74 LA. L. REV. 
649, 651 (2014). 
 355. Id. at 649, introductory footnote. 
